domingo, 24 de enero de 2016
Interview with Abdullah Mohtadi
INTERVIEW WITH MR. ABDULLAH MOHTADI, THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE KOMALA PARTY OF IRANIAN KURDISTAN
www.komala.org
Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Aveen Karim
The Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI) had the pleasant opportunity to meet with Mr. Abdullah Mohtadi, Secretary General of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan in Washington D.C during his visit and conducted an interview with him.
Thursday, 12 November 2015 08:27
Interview with Mr. Abdullah Mohtadi, the Secretary General of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan
WKI: Thank you for setting aside time in your busy schedule to meet with WKI. What is the main reason for your visit to the U.S?
AM: I have come here to raise awareness of the plight of Iranian Kurds. While the Kurds of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are, rightfully, on the front pages of international media, Iranian Kurds are mostly neglected by the West including the United States. I am also here to raise awareness of the despicable human rights abuses in Iran.
My message is simple: now that the nuclear deal has been struck, it’s time to focus on the human rights issues in Iran. We are concerned that the nuclear issue has dominated everything and overshadowed Iran’s human rights violations. I hope to see more engagement in the near future by the United States with Iran on human rights issues. It’s important that the international community, especially the United States Congress, administration, and public are informed about violations of basic human rights in Iran and speak out against the atrocities committed by the regime.
WKI: To what extent does the Iranian nuclear deal affect the Kurdish people in Rojhelat? What is your opinion on this deal?
AM: We are not against the nuclear deal, but know that this is not the only problem with Iran. It’s alright that a commitment has been made to stop the nuclear program – it was an unnecessary and wasteful program and we were against it from the beginning. But it is important not to forget that the Iranian regime also has a terrible record of human rights violations, repressive domestic policies and expansionist regional policies to destabilize its neighbors. Now is the time to focus on issues other than Iran’s nuclear ambition, most importantly, human rights.
WKI: Did you feel that there will be support from the U.S toward the people of Rojhelat? Do you see any hope? Especially after the Iran deal was signed.
AM: As far as I know, no Kurdish strategy or Kurdish policy has been adopted by the United States so far, though I hope they will formulate a Kurdish policy where the Iranian Kurds can also find their place.
WKI: Do you think the lack of the support by the great powers for eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) is because more than one party is leftist?
AM: No. It’s not accurate and I don’t think it’s relevant. As with us, we are a social democratic party, we have long been affiliated with the Socialist International, the respected international body of labor and social democratic parties of the world including European parties. We have recently gained membership.
WKI: Your party has stopped the armed struggle against the Iranian regime, why is that? What has changed?
AM: We stopped armed struggle about two decades ago, but we have kept our training camps and our Peshmerga forces who we need for the security of our people as we also house many families. We also have headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Our Peshmerga forces also act as a deterrent for the Iranian regime making them think twice when they deal with Kurds in Iran. To have Peshmerga is a boost of morale for Kurdish people.
However, we are mainly engaged in civil, political and organizational work in the country. Komala has been instrumental in organizing mass protests, including general strikes, in Iranian Kurdistan in the last few years. In 2005 we had month-long demonstrations, in 2010 a hugely successful general strike in every city, a strong protest movement in Mahabad last May, ongoing teachers movement, and much more. These are the ways that the Kurdish movement manifests itself. If this had taken place without Peshmerga, the regime would have killed and executed many more people and would not have hesitated with repressive measures. We stopped our armed struggle for the interest of our people, but who knows, maybe that will change.
WKI: You mentioned your presence in the Kurdish region of Iraq. How are your relations with the Kurdish political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan?
AM: We support the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) although we are aware of the shortcomings. Their achievements are a valuable source of pride for all Kurds. We have close relations with all their parties including the PUK and KDP. Our Peshmerga have assisted the KRG forces on the front lines fighting ISIS in Kirkuk and they were successful in their mission.
WKI: We would like to know about the non-Kurdish Iranian opposition parties. Do other Iranian opposition parties acknowledge Kurdish rights?
AM: I hope they acknowledge Kurdish rights, we are cooperating with them in fighting for democracy in Iran. In respect of Kurdish rights, we have been trying to raise awareness and highlight the Kurdish issue within Iran because not everybody is aware of the plight of the Kurds. That’s why it is an important point to work on, although eventually it is the unity of strength of the Kurds themselves in Iran that can bring about their rights in the country.
We work together with different ethnic groups in Iran. We are co-founders of the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran – an umbrella organization founded in 2005 among Kurds, Balochies, Arabs in Ahwaz, Turkmen and some Azerbijanis – that stands for a democratic, secular, pluralist federal Iran.
We are also part of different coalitions among Iranian opposition. In 2009 we supported the green movement which broke out in protest of vote rigging in Iran with millions of people taking to the streets. Of course we knew the limitations of the ideology and the leadership behind the movement but we believed that it could be a vehicle of change. We rescued many of the movements activists by helping them escape through the Kurdistan Region of Iraq through our underground organization. They were then able to contact western embassies and apply for political asylum.
The Kurdish movement in Iran has always been a strong symbol of democracy and I think this will remain the case in the future. The Kurds are indispensable component in any democratic change in Iran. The Iranian opposition acknowledges the significance of the Kurds in any political development in Iran and Kurds also realise that they cannot bring about political change in the structure of Iran on their own. That is why we have to cooperate with each other, in the meantime we advocate Kurdish rights and I think eventually we can win over the majority of public opinion in Iran.
WKI: Many consider the Iranian President Rouhani a moderate. Do you believe that Rouhani will give some rights to the Kurds in Iran?
AM: Of course he is a moderate compared to Ali Khamenei the supreme leader, but he has not taken any significant steps to implement Kurdish rights in the past two years. In fact, the rate of execution has risen during his time in office, repression of the Kurdish people is just as it has always been, and I don’t see any real, tangible change.
WKI: How are your relations with other Kurdish political parties in Iran?
AM: We are on friendly terms with them. We have no hostility with anybody and even signed an agreement of alliance with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) three years ago. We hope we can broaden this alliance to include other political groups in Iranian Kurdistan.
WKI: What is your vision for the future of the Kurds in Iran in the long term?
AM: I hope Kurds can get their full rights in Iran and the region. We, as the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, are for a democratic, pluralist and federal Iran, where the rights of Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities are safe-guarded in the constitution and respected by the government. Iran needs a complete structural change. You cannot have democracy without basic human rights. Iran is a country where ethnic and religious minorities are repressed and discriminated against, this needs to be changed and I hope to see this change in the near future
sábado, 23 de enero de 2016
"The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad" by Hiwa Nezhadian
The Kurdish Republic Of Mahabad 1946
vokradio.com, LosAngeles, California, USA
http://www.vokradio.com/content/view/87/47/
The following article was published on old vokradio website on February 2006.
The paper was presented in a Kurdish-related event on 6th February 2006 in the UCLA (University of California-Los Angeles) - School of Public Policy, USA entitled “From Kurdish prospective: Iraq, the world and the future of the Kurdish people”.
The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 1946
By: Hiwa Nezhadian
2006-02-11
Ladies and gentlemen, it's not common to have a gathering like this one and talk to the academia and American audience about the plight of the Kurdish people, their history and how the ruling Middle Eastern governments perceive them. I am glad I am here tonight on the 60th anniversary of the Kurdish republic of 1946 and I hope to answer some historical questions in your minds. So, I briefly talk about the creation of the Republic, the political mood and the environment of WWII in the northern part of Eastern Kurdistan, i.e. the part under the Iran's control.
The brutal suppression of Sheikh Mehmud's kingdom in South Kurdistan (today's northern Iraq), a populace movement in the early 1920, cheating the Kurds of northern Kurdistan (today's Turkey) by Kemal Ataturk in 1910's, the promise of independence by the allied powers in the Treaty of Sevres in the August of 1920 and the subsequent Treaty of Lozanne by the League of Nations in 1923 which undermined the Kurdish self-determination as it was promised in the Treaty of Sevres, in support of a greater Turkey and therefore the final division of Kurdish land between Iran, and the newly created states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Constant harassment and bombardment of Kurdish towns and villages by the British Royal Air force and creating chaos and animosity among major Kurdish clans to discredit Mahmud Barzanji in the region, undermining the will of the people by the British in today's northern part of Iraq, brutal suppression of Eastern Kurdistan and the assassination of their leader Simko by Reza Shah of Iran in 1930, Kurdish genocide by the new state of Turkey between 1925 and 1933, left a bitter and unforgettable memories in the minds of the Kurds all over the Middle East.
As Iran was occupied in September 1941 by the armies of the US, UK and the Soviets and Reza Shah was deported by the allied powers to South Africa, the country was left with a weak government with little control over areas outside of the central province of Tehran. An atmosphere of freedom and joy spread all over the country. The situation was perfect for the Kurds to cease the moment and set up a political organization different from prior organizations that were mostly clan dominated, feudal infiltrated and religious organized groups.
They set up a party with a political agenda and platform mostly by middle class educated urban nationalists in August 1941 in Mahabad, called Kurdish Resurrection Society or KJK. By some accounts this organization was originally established in July of 1938 under the name of Kurdish Freedom Party.
KJK was a secret society with members sworn in to the flag of Kurdistan and the holy book in front of three witnesses. Members had to promise not to betray other members and not to commit acts of treason against the Kurdish people and their political, economic and cultural interests. KJK membership was solely based on friends and confidants introducing each other to the membership committee therefore very soon it became a very strongly bonded organization.
By 1942 when Iran and central government was at its weakest point, the country was divided in three zones; Southern part was under the influence and armies of the United Kingdom and the USA. Central zone was neutral and northern part was under the Soviet occupation.
Kurdistan of Iran on the other hand was under the UK and Soviet influence. From its southern areas, i.e. the provinces of Lorestan, Ilam and Kirmashan and parts of Kurdistan province up to the city of Saqez were under the British influence and from Saqez to the Russian border in the north, under the influence of the Soviets, however Soviet army were not present in many parts of their sphere of influence in Kurdistan, especially in Mehabad.
Qazi Mohamed was the judge of the city of Mehabad and surrounding areas, a very influential and respected man among the people, a visionary man with love for the people and the country. He was a strong advocate of education, well being of the people and Kurdish culture and heritage. Qazi was asked by some members of KJK in secret, in Oct of 1944 to see if he is interested in joining the group, and he accepted.
As Qazi Mohemed became a member he soon became the icon and spokesperson for KJK and as he was becoming more involved in the KJK or komeleh, the organization was coming out to the surface. In November of 1945 in an assembly of sixty tribal and local leaders gathered on an invitation from Qazi to listen to a speech that necessitated the forming of a party that is open and come out of secrecy. Then KJK changed name under the advice of Mr. Qazi and the Soviets to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). KDP established a very basic and simple agenda as the basis of the party platform, which was formulated in the following eight articles:
1. The Kurdish people of Iran shall have self-government in the administration of their local affairs.
2. The Kurdish language shall be the official language and shall be used in education.
3. A Provincial Council in Kurdistan shall be elected immediately according to Iranian constitutional law and shall exercise it's right of controlling and overseeing all public meetings.
4. All government officials shall be Kurds.
6. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan shall make efforts to establish complete fraternity with the people of Azerbaijan and minority elements living there.
7. The Party shall work for the improvement of the moral standards, the health, and the economic conditions of the Kurdish people by the development of education, public health, commerce and agriculture.
8. The KDP demands freedom of political action for all the people of Iran so that the whole country may rejoice in progress.
As the above articles of freedom were the aspiration of the people of Kurdistan, the Party soon gained tens of thousands of members all across Kurdistan but its activities were limited to the northern cities and villages.
At a town meeting in January 22nd of 1946 in the main square of Mahabad, delegates from all across Kurdistan, from the Russian border to the central part of Iranian Kurdistan, with representatives from the southern provinces of Sanandaj, Kirmashan, and surroundings, as well as from Kurdistan of Syria, Turkey and Iraq's participation, KDP announced the Republic of Kurdistan. The Kurds of Iraq offered their best fighting men, about 1200 strong under the leadership of the legendary Mustafa Barzani that helped establish the republic's army of 12,750.
At it's first public meeting the leadership announced a cabinet meeting and started the affairs of Kurdistan as it was announced in the KDP's platform, which endowed with a remarkable dynamism and achieved several of the party's agenda among them;
a) Kurdish became the official language of administration and education in schools.
b) Several Kurdish periodicals appeared regularly among them, Kurdistan, the daily newspaper and the party's official organ, Helaleh magazine for women and Grugali Mindalan for the children and a number of other periodicals.
c) Kurdish women began to play an active role in the political and social life for the first time.
d) Trade with the USSR expanded and the economy began to improve.
e) Schools for the minority Jews, Azaries and Armenians opened and encouraged in their native languages.
f) The top jobs in the administration, which had until then been held by non-local Persians and Azerbaijanis were given to the Kurds
g) The Imperial Army and Police were dissolved and replaced with National Army and Peshmergeh forces.
The cabinet was composed of thirteen ministers, including War minister and Foreign Secretary. As no parliament has been elected yet, there was no legislative assembly, so laws were issued by presidential decree, but the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice assumed all judicial tasks.
The precise status of the new government was still indeterminate to whether it was an autonomous regional government or a fully independent state. On one side there were active participation of Kurds from outside of Iran and ambition for a greater Kurdistan, on the other side according to article 3 of the party agenda, ..."a Provincial Council in Kurdistan shall be elected according to Iranian constitutional law..."
While there was a Kurdish government in northwest of Iran, east of Kurdistan there was another local government established in Azerbaijan. On 23rd April 1946, the governments of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan signed a treaty of friendship with the following seven articles:
1) The representatives of the two governments will be accredited in each other's territory whenever they consider it necessary.
2) In Azerbaijan territory with majority Kurdish population, Kurdish administration will be appointed and vice versa.
3) The two governments will set up a commission to deal with economic questions and this commission shall be responsible to the leaders of the two governments.
4) Whenever necessary, Azarbaijan and Kurdistan will form a military alliance providing for mutual support.
5) Any negotiations with the Tehran Government must have the approval of the two governments.
6) The Government of Azarbaijan will take measures to contribute to the development of the Kurdish language and culture among the Kurds living in Azarbaijan territory and vice versa.
7) The two governments shall punish whoever tries to undermine the historic friendship, the democratic unity or the alliance between the two peoples, conjointly.
In spite of these agreements and understanding, the fact remained that there were major differences in approaching the internal affairs of the two states. In Kurdistan the land reform and workers demand were not taken so much into consideration as in their neighboring Azerbaijan, national unity was more on the agenda. For one Kurdish society was much more backward than the Azarbaijan's and there were no sign of industrial complex in Kurdish territory, and second, many Kurdish landowners were strong supporters of creation of the nation state and Kurdish national aspirations.
The frontiers between the two states were still undetermined. The status of the western cities of Khoy, Shahpour, Urmieh and Miandoab, the three islands in Lake Urmieh among the points of dispute. But in the spring of 1946 these differences were secondary. Main priority was the defense of the tow states very existence from the aggressive policies of the Tehran regime strongly supported by the Americans and the British.
Iran after WWII was seen by the Americans and British as an oil gate from the Middle East to turn on the industrial complex of the West. Therefore they saw it in their best interest to leave Iran intact and subvert any divisions politically and geographically. With the help of the Americans, Iranian Army entered the city of Tabriz in 13 December of 1946, the Azarbaijan republic collapsed.
The sudden collapse of Azarbaijan stunned the people of Kurdistan. They were caught by surprise and mostly they didn't expect the Russian betrayal of their Azerbaijani brothers.
In Mehabad Qazi and his colleagues never seriously contemplated resistance after it became clear that the Soviet Union had allowed their Azerbaijani creation to collapse. Of the party officials a group of militants began to discuss flight and asylum in Iraq or the USSR. They made their preparations and on the evening of Dec. 14 went to Qazi's house to ask him to join them Qazi approved the project and told them to take away any provisions they required; but he would stay with the people of Mehabad whom he had sworn to protect.
In Dec. 15 the Soviet Commercial representative in Mehabad, Asadov, left for the Soviet Consulate in Urmieh. Taxed with a Kurdish official for having betrayed his friends, Asadov lamely replied that the status of the republic had become an international issue, but that if the name of the party had changed back to Komeleh, (KJK), perhaps the Russians would help. After some negotiations with the Kurdish leaders, the Iranian Army entered the city of Mehabad the Kurdish capitol without resistance, and surrendered on Dec. 17, 1946.
In late March 1947 president Qazi and a number of cabinet members and high ranking officers, in spite of promise of clemency and negotiations, were hanged in Mehabad, Bukan, Saqqez and hundreds were sentenced with long term imprisonments
The Republic of Kurdistan lasted no more than eleven months but it left a legacy in the history of the Kurdish struggles. It was a symbol of freedom for the Kurds all over the five countries spread around in the Middle East and it showed the world that Kurds can stand on their feet and establish a nation state if the opportunity is offered to them, that is if they are recognized by the international community.
In spite of the successes and moments of joy and progress, the Kurdish Republic had some shortcomings. Among them:
i. The urban nationalists and educated sector that led the party for the most part were among the citizens of northern Kurdistan and mainly from Mehabad.
ii. The Kurdish society was inexperienced in politics and especially they were not aware of the international politics.
iii. The leadership put too much weight on the Russian support.
iv. The republic's army did not penetrate beyond central Kurdistan. They could have easily captured Sanandaj and Kirmashan, much larger and more populated than Mehabad but on the advice of the Soviets, they did not penetrate the south.
v. The leadership did not take effective advantage of the enormous military experience and power of General Barzani and his army with him. In a number of occasions Barzani offered to open a southern front but the president rejected it.
vi. Southern part of Iranian Kurdistan was under the British influence and by no means they would encourage Kurdish nationalism and self-determination, therefore the KDP had little influence and by the same token, modern Kurdish nationalism in the south did not grow as strong as in the north.
There were also strong points:
vii. The Republic created an atmosphere of peace, trust among the people, and boosted moral and self-confidence.
viii. The republic brought the dream of millions of Kurds to reality.
ix. The republic made Kurdish language official and in the short period that it was in power, many magazines and periodicals came to existence, which until then it was impossible under the Shah's regime.
x. The KDP sent a number of young students to the Soviet Union to gain higher education in order to bring them back and help the people. After the fall of the Republic mostly became highly educated, but almost all stayed behind.
Lessons learned from the republic's experience:
xi. A political system can survive only if it is conducted democratically. President Qazi and his cabinet were democratically elected and he was highly successful and popular for the short period they were in power.
xii. Kurdish question, although it seems an internal affair in any one of the countries Kurds live in, it always is an international issue. Kurdish politicians should consider that very seriously.
xiii. The Kurds should know by now that any alliance with an outside force is strategic and temporary; the ultimate reliance should be upon them.
xiv. When it comes to the future of the Kurdish people, the political boundaries among the four countries separating Kurdish nation can be easily broken and to the Kurds, they are one nation and inseparable. As we witnessed the Kurdish Republic of 1946, in a small part of Kurdish land, that was no more than 1/10th of the total areas of Kurdistan, representative from all over Kurdistan came to witness the success and some actively participated.
xv. No matter how much there are tensions and differences between the states ruling Kurdistan, they are always united against the Kurds. Therefore there is only one alternative for the Kurds to get to freedom and that is to get united.
With these thoughts I leave you and maybe we get a chance for questions and answers at the end of the program
vokradio.com, LosAngeles, California, USA
http://www.vokradio.com/content/view/87/47/
The following article was published on old vokradio website on February 2006.
The paper was presented in a Kurdish-related event on 6th February 2006 in the UCLA (University of California-Los Angeles) - School of Public Policy, USA entitled “From Kurdish prospective: Iraq, the world and the future of the Kurdish people”.
The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad 1946
By: Hiwa Nezhadian
2006-02-11
Ladies and gentlemen, it's not common to have a gathering like this one and talk to the academia and American audience about the plight of the Kurdish people, their history and how the ruling Middle Eastern governments perceive them. I am glad I am here tonight on the 60th anniversary of the Kurdish republic of 1946 and I hope to answer some historical questions in your minds. So, I briefly talk about the creation of the Republic, the political mood and the environment of WWII in the northern part of Eastern Kurdistan, i.e. the part under the Iran's control.
The brutal suppression of Sheikh Mehmud's kingdom in South Kurdistan (today's northern Iraq), a populace movement in the early 1920, cheating the Kurds of northern Kurdistan (today's Turkey) by Kemal Ataturk in 1910's, the promise of independence by the allied powers in the Treaty of Sevres in the August of 1920 and the subsequent Treaty of Lozanne by the League of Nations in 1923 which undermined the Kurdish self-determination as it was promised in the Treaty of Sevres, in support of a greater Turkey and therefore the final division of Kurdish land between Iran, and the newly created states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Constant harassment and bombardment of Kurdish towns and villages by the British Royal Air force and creating chaos and animosity among major Kurdish clans to discredit Mahmud Barzanji in the region, undermining the will of the people by the British in today's northern part of Iraq, brutal suppression of Eastern Kurdistan and the assassination of their leader Simko by Reza Shah of Iran in 1930, Kurdish genocide by the new state of Turkey between 1925 and 1933, left a bitter and unforgettable memories in the minds of the Kurds all over the Middle East.
As Iran was occupied in September 1941 by the armies of the US, UK and the Soviets and Reza Shah was deported by the allied powers to South Africa, the country was left with a weak government with little control over areas outside of the central province of Tehran. An atmosphere of freedom and joy spread all over the country. The situation was perfect for the Kurds to cease the moment and set up a political organization different from prior organizations that were mostly clan dominated, feudal infiltrated and religious organized groups.
They set up a party with a political agenda and platform mostly by middle class educated urban nationalists in August 1941 in Mahabad, called Kurdish Resurrection Society or KJK. By some accounts this organization was originally established in July of 1938 under the name of Kurdish Freedom Party.
KJK was a secret society with members sworn in to the flag of Kurdistan and the holy book in front of three witnesses. Members had to promise not to betray other members and not to commit acts of treason against the Kurdish people and their political, economic and cultural interests. KJK membership was solely based on friends and confidants introducing each other to the membership committee therefore very soon it became a very strongly bonded organization.
By 1942 when Iran and central government was at its weakest point, the country was divided in three zones; Southern part was under the influence and armies of the United Kingdom and the USA. Central zone was neutral and northern part was under the Soviet occupation.
Kurdistan of Iran on the other hand was under the UK and Soviet influence. From its southern areas, i.e. the provinces of Lorestan, Ilam and Kirmashan and parts of Kurdistan province up to the city of Saqez were under the British influence and from Saqez to the Russian border in the north, under the influence of the Soviets, however Soviet army were not present in many parts of their sphere of influence in Kurdistan, especially in Mehabad.
Qazi Mohamed was the judge of the city of Mehabad and surrounding areas, a very influential and respected man among the people, a visionary man with love for the people and the country. He was a strong advocate of education, well being of the people and Kurdish culture and heritage. Qazi was asked by some members of KJK in secret, in Oct of 1944 to see if he is interested in joining the group, and he accepted.
As Qazi Mohemed became a member he soon became the icon and spokesperson for KJK and as he was becoming more involved in the KJK or komeleh, the organization was coming out to the surface. In November of 1945 in an assembly of sixty tribal and local leaders gathered on an invitation from Qazi to listen to a speech that necessitated the forming of a party that is open and come out of secrecy. Then KJK changed name under the advice of Mr. Qazi and the Soviets to the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). KDP established a very basic and simple agenda as the basis of the party platform, which was formulated in the following eight articles:
1. The Kurdish people of Iran shall have self-government in the administration of their local affairs.
2. The Kurdish language shall be the official language and shall be used in education.
3. A Provincial Council in Kurdistan shall be elected immediately according to Iranian constitutional law and shall exercise it's right of controlling and overseeing all public meetings.
4. All government officials shall be Kurds.
6. The Democratic Party of Kurdistan shall make efforts to establish complete fraternity with the people of Azerbaijan and minority elements living there.
7. The Party shall work for the improvement of the moral standards, the health, and the economic conditions of the Kurdish people by the development of education, public health, commerce and agriculture.
8. The KDP demands freedom of political action for all the people of Iran so that the whole country may rejoice in progress.
As the above articles of freedom were the aspiration of the people of Kurdistan, the Party soon gained tens of thousands of members all across Kurdistan but its activities were limited to the northern cities and villages.
At a town meeting in January 22nd of 1946 in the main square of Mahabad, delegates from all across Kurdistan, from the Russian border to the central part of Iranian Kurdistan, with representatives from the southern provinces of Sanandaj, Kirmashan, and surroundings, as well as from Kurdistan of Syria, Turkey and Iraq's participation, KDP announced the Republic of Kurdistan. The Kurds of Iraq offered their best fighting men, about 1200 strong under the leadership of the legendary Mustafa Barzani that helped establish the republic's army of 12,750.
At it's first public meeting the leadership announced a cabinet meeting and started the affairs of Kurdistan as it was announced in the KDP's platform, which endowed with a remarkable dynamism and achieved several of the party's agenda among them;
a) Kurdish became the official language of administration and education in schools.
b) Several Kurdish periodicals appeared regularly among them, Kurdistan, the daily newspaper and the party's official organ, Helaleh magazine for women and Grugali Mindalan for the children and a number of other periodicals.
c) Kurdish women began to play an active role in the political and social life for the first time.
d) Trade with the USSR expanded and the economy began to improve.
e) Schools for the minority Jews, Azaries and Armenians opened and encouraged in their native languages.
f) The top jobs in the administration, which had until then been held by non-local Persians and Azerbaijanis were given to the Kurds
g) The Imperial Army and Police were dissolved and replaced with National Army and Peshmergeh forces.
The cabinet was composed of thirteen ministers, including War minister and Foreign Secretary. As no parliament has been elected yet, there was no legislative assembly, so laws were issued by presidential decree, but the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice assumed all judicial tasks.
The precise status of the new government was still indeterminate to whether it was an autonomous regional government or a fully independent state. On one side there were active participation of Kurds from outside of Iran and ambition for a greater Kurdistan, on the other side according to article 3 of the party agenda, ..."a Provincial Council in Kurdistan shall be elected according to Iranian constitutional law..."
While there was a Kurdish government in northwest of Iran, east of Kurdistan there was another local government established in Azerbaijan. On 23rd April 1946, the governments of Kurdistan and Azerbaijan signed a treaty of friendship with the following seven articles:
1) The representatives of the two governments will be accredited in each other's territory whenever they consider it necessary.
2) In Azerbaijan territory with majority Kurdish population, Kurdish administration will be appointed and vice versa.
3) The two governments will set up a commission to deal with economic questions and this commission shall be responsible to the leaders of the two governments.
4) Whenever necessary, Azarbaijan and Kurdistan will form a military alliance providing for mutual support.
5) Any negotiations with the Tehran Government must have the approval of the two governments.
6) The Government of Azarbaijan will take measures to contribute to the development of the Kurdish language and culture among the Kurds living in Azarbaijan territory and vice versa.
7) The two governments shall punish whoever tries to undermine the historic friendship, the democratic unity or the alliance between the two peoples, conjointly.
In spite of these agreements and understanding, the fact remained that there were major differences in approaching the internal affairs of the two states. In Kurdistan the land reform and workers demand were not taken so much into consideration as in their neighboring Azerbaijan, national unity was more on the agenda. For one Kurdish society was much more backward than the Azarbaijan's and there were no sign of industrial complex in Kurdish territory, and second, many Kurdish landowners were strong supporters of creation of the nation state and Kurdish national aspirations.
The frontiers between the two states were still undetermined. The status of the western cities of Khoy, Shahpour, Urmieh and Miandoab, the three islands in Lake Urmieh among the points of dispute. But in the spring of 1946 these differences were secondary. Main priority was the defense of the tow states very existence from the aggressive policies of the Tehran regime strongly supported by the Americans and the British.
Iran after WWII was seen by the Americans and British as an oil gate from the Middle East to turn on the industrial complex of the West. Therefore they saw it in their best interest to leave Iran intact and subvert any divisions politically and geographically. With the help of the Americans, Iranian Army entered the city of Tabriz in 13 December of 1946, the Azarbaijan republic collapsed.
The sudden collapse of Azarbaijan stunned the people of Kurdistan. They were caught by surprise and mostly they didn't expect the Russian betrayal of their Azerbaijani brothers.
In Mehabad Qazi and his colleagues never seriously contemplated resistance after it became clear that the Soviet Union had allowed their Azerbaijani creation to collapse. Of the party officials a group of militants began to discuss flight and asylum in Iraq or the USSR. They made their preparations and on the evening of Dec. 14 went to Qazi's house to ask him to join them Qazi approved the project and told them to take away any provisions they required; but he would stay with the people of Mehabad whom he had sworn to protect.
In Dec. 15 the Soviet Commercial representative in Mehabad, Asadov, left for the Soviet Consulate in Urmieh. Taxed with a Kurdish official for having betrayed his friends, Asadov lamely replied that the status of the republic had become an international issue, but that if the name of the party had changed back to Komeleh, (KJK), perhaps the Russians would help. After some negotiations with the Kurdish leaders, the Iranian Army entered the city of Mehabad the Kurdish capitol without resistance, and surrendered on Dec. 17, 1946.
In late March 1947 president Qazi and a number of cabinet members and high ranking officers, in spite of promise of clemency and negotiations, were hanged in Mehabad, Bukan, Saqqez and hundreds were sentenced with long term imprisonments
The Republic of Kurdistan lasted no more than eleven months but it left a legacy in the history of the Kurdish struggles. It was a symbol of freedom for the Kurds all over the five countries spread around in the Middle East and it showed the world that Kurds can stand on their feet and establish a nation state if the opportunity is offered to them, that is if they are recognized by the international community.
In spite of the successes and moments of joy and progress, the Kurdish Republic had some shortcomings. Among them:
i. The urban nationalists and educated sector that led the party for the most part were among the citizens of northern Kurdistan and mainly from Mehabad.
ii. The Kurdish society was inexperienced in politics and especially they were not aware of the international politics.
iii. The leadership put too much weight on the Russian support.
iv. The republic's army did not penetrate beyond central Kurdistan. They could have easily captured Sanandaj and Kirmashan, much larger and more populated than Mehabad but on the advice of the Soviets, they did not penetrate the south.
v. The leadership did not take effective advantage of the enormous military experience and power of General Barzani and his army with him. In a number of occasions Barzani offered to open a southern front but the president rejected it.
vi. Southern part of Iranian Kurdistan was under the British influence and by no means they would encourage Kurdish nationalism and self-determination, therefore the KDP had little influence and by the same token, modern Kurdish nationalism in the south did not grow as strong as in the north.
There were also strong points:
vii. The Republic created an atmosphere of peace, trust among the people, and boosted moral and self-confidence.
viii. The republic brought the dream of millions of Kurds to reality.
ix. The republic made Kurdish language official and in the short period that it was in power, many magazines and periodicals came to existence, which until then it was impossible under the Shah's regime.
x. The KDP sent a number of young students to the Soviet Union to gain higher education in order to bring them back and help the people. After the fall of the Republic mostly became highly educated, but almost all stayed behind.
Lessons learned from the republic's experience:
xi. A political system can survive only if it is conducted democratically. President Qazi and his cabinet were democratically elected and he was highly successful and popular for the short period they were in power.
xii. Kurdish question, although it seems an internal affair in any one of the countries Kurds live in, it always is an international issue. Kurdish politicians should consider that very seriously.
xiii. The Kurds should know by now that any alliance with an outside force is strategic and temporary; the ultimate reliance should be upon them.
xiv. When it comes to the future of the Kurdish people, the political boundaries among the four countries separating Kurdish nation can be easily broken and to the Kurds, they are one nation and inseparable. As we witnessed the Kurdish Republic of 1946, in a small part of Kurdish land, that was no more than 1/10th of the total areas of Kurdistan, representative from all over Kurdistan came to witness the success and some actively participated.
xv. No matter how much there are tensions and differences between the states ruling Kurdistan, they are always united against the Kurds. Therefore there is only one alternative for the Kurds to get to freedom and that is to get united.
With these thoughts I leave you and maybe we get a chance for questions and answers at the end of the program
viernes, 8 de mayo de 2015
Human Rights Report: 956 Kurds imprisoned and 206 killed by Iran in 2014
Yearly Human Rights Report: 956 Kurds Imprisoned and 206 were Killed or Injured by Iran
by PDKI | on March 27, 2015 | in Human Rights |
According to data gathered by the PDKI, at least 956 Kurds have been arrested by Iranian authorities during the past year (which, according to the Kurdish calendar, is between 21 March 2014 to 21 March 2015). 206 Kurds have been either killed or injured by Iranian security forces or by landmines during the same period.
Of the 956 Kurds that have been arrested, 415 of them have not yet been convicted or released. 386 individuals were released after being interrogated and 79 were handed prison sentences.
During the past year, 74 Kurds were shot by Iranian security forces in different cities and towns. 79 Kurds were shot on the border with southern Kurdistan (Iraq) and north Kurdistan (Turkey) and 63 Kurds were victims of landmines.
Of the 79 Kurds that were shot on the border, 37 died and 42 were severely injured.
Out of the 74 Kurds that were shot by Iranian security forces in the different cities and towns of eastern Kurdistan (Iran), 20 died and 44 were injured.
Out of the 63 victims of landmines, 22 died and 41 were injured.
by PDKI | on March 27, 2015 | in Human Rights |
According to data gathered by the PDKI, at least 956 Kurds have been arrested by Iranian authorities during the past year (which, according to the Kurdish calendar, is between 21 March 2014 to 21 March 2015). 206 Kurds have been either killed or injured by Iranian security forces or by landmines during the same period.
Of the 956 Kurds that have been arrested, 415 of them have not yet been convicted or released. 386 individuals were released after being interrogated and 79 were handed prison sentences.
During the past year, 74 Kurds were shot by Iranian security forces in different cities and towns. 79 Kurds were shot on the border with southern Kurdistan (Iraq) and north Kurdistan (Turkey) and 63 Kurds were victims of landmines.
Of the 79 Kurds that were shot on the border, 37 died and 42 were severely injured.
Out of the 74 Kurds that were shot by Iranian security forces in the different cities and towns of eastern Kurdistan (Iran), 20 died and 44 were injured.
Out of the 63 victims of landmines, 22 died and 41 were injured.
domingo, 19 de abril de 2015
Mohtadi (Komaleh) warns about Iranian Regime
Iran nuclear talks: Top Kurdish dissident warns Islamic regime 'are oppressors and liars'
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-nuclear-talks-top-kurdish-dissident-warns-that-islamic-regime-are-oppressors-liars-1494513
By Orlando Crowcroft Executive Editor
April 1, 2015 11:39 BST
Iranian Kurdish dissident Abdullah Mohtadi says that Iranian regime are oppressors and liars
Even in the swanky lobby of a five star hotel in London Victoria, Iranian Kurdish dissident Abdullah Mohtadi has to look over his shoulder. As secretary general of the Kurdish Komala party, he has not been able to return to his home in the north of Iran for three decades.
"I am one of the most wanted people in Iran. The Iranian regime has assassinated hundreds of people outside of their own country. I do not feel safe anywhere in the world," he told IBTimes UK during a brief visit to London from his home In Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.
Komala is one two main parties that represent between five and six million Kurds living in four Kurdish-majority provinces in Iran's North West. Kurds refer to this region as East Kurdistan, with the Kurdish areas of Iraq, Syria and Turkey known as South, West and North Kurdistan respectively.
“'I do not think the Iranian regime are part of the solution, they are part of the problem.'”
- Abdullah Mohtadi
Only in Iraq and to a certain degree Syria do Kurds have any real political autonomy. Turkish and Iranian Kurdish parties are banned and Kurds suffer severe restrictions on their language, traditions and culture. Mohtadi said that in 2015 that repression in Iran is worse than ever.
"Kurdish NGOs are not allowed in [Iranian] Kurdistan. The situation is still very hard. They execute young people for protesting. [Iranian] Kurdistan is reaching boiling point," he said.
Komala has not engaged militarily with Iran for 18 years, says Mohtadi, as the Kurdish movement supports pro-democracy movements in the country rather than violence.
As a young man, Mohtadi took part in the revolution in 1979 which saw the overthrow of the Shah, but when Ayatollah Khomeini returned and established the Islamic theocracy that rules Iran to this day, he fled to the north of the country and then, in 1983, left Iran completely.
The Kurds supported the Green Movement that swept Iran in 2009-2010, but since it was violently put down by the government the situation for democratic Iranian parties – the Kurds included – has been increasingly dire. A new generation of Iranian Kurds is growing increasingly angry and looking to parties such as Komala to stand up for them.
“'The international community forgets about the violations and the human rights abuses against its own people – especially against Kurds.'” - Abdullah Mohtadi
As such, a return to violence could be inevitable, Mohtadi fears.
"It is especially unbearable for the young generation. They want us to do something. They are arresting and executing people just for celebrating Newroz [Kurdish New Year] – how long can you tolerate this?" he said.
As the West looks poised to sign a nuclear deal with Iran and bring Tehran in from 40 years of isolation, Mohtadi said that the international community has overlooked the negative affect Iran has on the entire Middle East region.
"We're not against a nuclear deal as such but we hope they don't make so many concessions to Iran that could embolden them in their domestic and regional policies. Look at the balance sheet of this regime: they have been ruling the country for 36 years. They have ruined the country and its economy and its reputation. They have turned Iran into a prison for women, for the young, and for ethnic groups," he said.
"The international community forgets about the violations and the human rights abuses against its own people – especially against Kurds."
Mohtadi believes that the perception of President Hassan Rouhani as a reformer is a myth, and points out that there have been more executions under the leader than under his anti-Western predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Iranian Kurdish militias made headlines in recent weeks after they joined Iraqi Kurdish fighters in the fight to liberate Kirkuk from IS. Komala fighters were part of the operation, pitting them effectively on the same side as Iran, who were pushing north to combat IS in Tikrit.
“'[Islamic State] is a terrorist group that is against everything that is dear to us.'”
- Abdullah Mohtadi
But Mohtadi said that the 60 Komala fighters currently on the front line in Kirkuk were defending Kurds, and said that Iranian Kurdish peshmerga would take no part in any operation to liberate non-Kurdish areas from IS – including Mosul, an IS stronghold since June 2014.
"They are a terrorist group that are against Kurds, against the Yazidis, against democracy, against everything that is dear to us," said Mohtadi.
He remains concerned about the role of Iranian-backed Shia militias and Iranian military commanders such as General Qassem Suleimani, the head of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, in the recent offensive to liberate Tikrit from Islamic State (IS).
"I do not think the Iranian regime are part of the solution, they are part of the problem. They should not be allowed to take part in any operation inside Iraq," he said.
As for President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry – who have staked the Obama administration's legacy on a deal with Iran – Mohtadi only has words of warning.
"Even if they sign a deal with the US, still lots of problems will remain. They are sponsoring terrorism, interfering in many countries in the region. They are destabilising the whole region. The West must not forget that they are oppressors and liars," he said.
jueves, 26 de marzo de 2015
"What Are Iran's Goals in Iraq?" - Mustafa Hijri (PDKI)
What are Iran’s Goals in Iraq?
By: Mustafa Hijri
Currently, Iranian forces alongside with Shiite militias, who are funded and controlled by Iran, are fighting the Daash in Tikrit and other places in Iraq. The Daash , or Daesh, gained international attention following the seizure of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. However, more than a year before Daesh seized control of Mosul, our party publicly warned, based on credible intelligence, that Iranian agents had infiltrated Daesh and that if unchecked, the expansion of this terrorist group would serve Iranian interests in Syria and beyond. Media outlets in the Gulf countries, citing their own intelligence sources, also warned about this reality.
To some analysts and policymakers in the West, these claims might seem puzzling. Some might even dismiss them as yet another conspiracy theory emanating from the Middle East.
However, aside from the intelligence on Iran’s infiltration of Daesh, past Iranian actions, open sources and the consequences of the rise of Daesh can be cited in support of those claims.
First, Iran’s support and funding of various terrorist groups throughout the Middle East is well known. For example, in a report by the Library of Congress on Iran’s Minister of Intelligence and Security, it is stated that Iran “provides financial, material, technological, or other support services to Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), all designated terrorist organizations under U.S. Executive Order 13224.”
While the Iranian regime adheres to a fundamentalist interpretation of Shiite Islam and is in conflict with the Sunnis, Tehran has on numerous occasions supported terrorist Sunni groups to destabilize strategically important countries in the Middle East. Iranian infiltration of and support for Daesh should therefore come as no surprise, although Iranian forces are fighting the group in Iraq.
Second, once the Iranian regime and its Syrian ally realized that secular forces who were taking the lead in the fight against the combined forces of Assad, Iran and Hezbollah could become a viable opposition force, they capitalized on Daesh’s split from al-Qaida and in various ways made sure that Daesh – which had set out to eliminate all other opposition groups – could become the dominant group in Syria. At the same time, Iraq’s former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, released many members of Daesh from prison that subsequently joined the group in Syria. Iran, the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria were fearful that the secular forces in Syria could become an ideologically attractive ally for the Western powers.
To discredit the Syrian opposition and paint it as a radical Sunni movement dominated by a vicious terrorist organization like Daesh, their aim was to compel the Western powers to reconsider their plans for regime change and accept the Assad regime as the lesser evil compared to a possible Daesh takeover in Syria. To this end, Iran and the Assad regime gave Daesh free leeway to establish its control over Raaqah in Syria, from where it later could expand into other parts of Syria and, as it turned out, even Iraq. Although this too might sound as bizarre, reports had for some time indicated the expansion of Daesh was indeed facilitated by Iran and Syria. For example, the Washington Post reported on June 10, 2014, the following: “Moderate rebel groups complain that Daash ’s rise has been aided by the relative disinterest shown by Syrian government forces in the areas under the group’s control, which are rarely subjected to airstrikes and bombardment. That has helped the group set up its own version of a government.”
Third, irrespective of whether one finds existing intelligence or the open sources in that regard as credible, the rise and expansion of Daesh has as a matter of fact served the interests of the Islamic regime in Iran. In other words, irrespective of Iranian intentions and schemes, the consequences of Daesh’s emergence as a formidable fighting force in Syria and, later, its expansion into Iraq has served the interests of the regime in Tehran.
Although Iran is allied with some Shiite groups in Iraq, the regime in Tehran has defined its strategic interests in Iraq in three ways. The first is to preclude the emergence of a federal democracy in Iraq that is stable and economically and politically strong enough to become a regional power with the capacity to block Iranian hegemony. Although the regime in Tehran is rhetorically committed to “friendly” relations with Iraq, it pursues a policy of divide and conquer toward its Shiite-dominated neighbor. The second strategic objective of Iran in Iraq is to make sure that democracy does not take root. In fact, Iran’s concerted effort is to make sure that democracy is associated with chaos and instability. The third Iranian strategic interest in Iraq is to undermine the Kurdistan regional government and make sure that the Kurds do not progress further. Iran is fearful of the Kurdistan regional government and its drive toward independence because of its demonstration effect on other parts of Kurdistan.
It is noteworthy that Daesh first stated that it would seize Baghdad once it consolidated itself in Mosul. However, Daesh instead attacked South Kurdistan. This came at a time when the Iraqi-Kurdish leadership called for a referendum on independence.
In short, Daesh’s expansion into Iraq, which was facilitated by Iran, the Assad regime and the Maliki government, has made Iraq even weaker and thus more amenable to Iranian control. The Iraqi army has been reduced substantially. Meanwhile, Shiite militias that answer to Iran have become the most powerful military forces in Iraq. These militias terrorize the Sunni population and thus perpetuate the sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. In fact, Daesh has helped the Shiite government in Iraq in this regard by eliminating prominent figures and tribal leaders with the Sunni community, thus making the Sunnis even more vulnerable. At the same time, the Kurdistan region’s war with Daesh has drained the limited resources of the Kurdish government, resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, several thousand dead and injured Peshmergas, as well as other dangerous consequences for Iraq at large and the Kurdistan region in particular.
In the midst of all this, there are naïve journalists, pundits and even some government officials in the Western world who have bought into the propaganda by the Iranian regime’s lobby that it is a force for “stability” in the region. The regime in Tehran, which is the major source of instability throughout the Middle East, is painted in some circles as a possible stabilizing factor in Iraq and elsewhere.
However, as recently warned by General David H. Petraeus, former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, the strategic threat to stability, democracy and western interests in Iraq and Syria is the Iranian regime. According to Gen. Petraeus, Iran is on the verge of creating a terrorist proxy similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon, thus posing a strategic threat to the balance of power in the region.
In spite of the economic siege on South Kurdistan, the Kurdish government and the brave Peshmerga forces have managed to not only withstand the multiple military attacks by Daesh, but also to push back this terrorist group from Kurdish territory. Once Daesh is defeated, a war between the Peshmerga Forces and the militias of Iran in Iraq is likely. This is likely to start in Kirkuk and other strategically important places.
To prevent a situation where the West has to decide whether to fight a war with Iran’s proxies in Iraq, the United States and its allies should increase their support for the Kurdistan region. Only through a visible presence in combination with financial and military support for the Kurdistan region can the West undermine Iran’s drive for hegemony in the Middle East.
By: Mustafa Hijri
Currently, Iranian forces alongside with Shiite militias, who are funded and controlled by Iran, are fighting the Daash in Tikrit and other places in Iraq. The Daash , or Daesh, gained international attention following the seizure of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. However, more than a year before Daesh seized control of Mosul, our party publicly warned, based on credible intelligence, that Iranian agents had infiltrated Daesh and that if unchecked, the expansion of this terrorist group would serve Iranian interests in Syria and beyond. Media outlets in the Gulf countries, citing their own intelligence sources, also warned about this reality.
To some analysts and policymakers in the West, these claims might seem puzzling. Some might even dismiss them as yet another conspiracy theory emanating from the Middle East.
However, aside from the intelligence on Iran’s infiltration of Daesh, past Iranian actions, open sources and the consequences of the rise of Daesh can be cited in support of those claims.
First, Iran’s support and funding of various terrorist groups throughout the Middle East is well known. For example, in a report by the Library of Congress on Iran’s Minister of Intelligence and Security, it is stated that Iran “provides financial, material, technological, or other support services to Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), all designated terrorist organizations under U.S. Executive Order 13224.”
While the Iranian regime adheres to a fundamentalist interpretation of Shiite Islam and is in conflict with the Sunnis, Tehran has on numerous occasions supported terrorist Sunni groups to destabilize strategically important countries in the Middle East. Iranian infiltration of and support for Daesh should therefore come as no surprise, although Iranian forces are fighting the group in Iraq.
Second, once the Iranian regime and its Syrian ally realized that secular forces who were taking the lead in the fight against the combined forces of Assad, Iran and Hezbollah could become a viable opposition force, they capitalized on Daesh’s split from al-Qaida and in various ways made sure that Daesh – which had set out to eliminate all other opposition groups – could become the dominant group in Syria. At the same time, Iraq’s former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, released many members of Daesh from prison that subsequently joined the group in Syria. Iran, the Shiite-dominated government in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria were fearful that the secular forces in Syria could become an ideologically attractive ally for the Western powers.
To discredit the Syrian opposition and paint it as a radical Sunni movement dominated by a vicious terrorist organization like Daesh, their aim was to compel the Western powers to reconsider their plans for regime change and accept the Assad regime as the lesser evil compared to a possible Daesh takeover in Syria. To this end, Iran and the Assad regime gave Daesh free leeway to establish its control over Raaqah in Syria, from where it later could expand into other parts of Syria and, as it turned out, even Iraq. Although this too might sound as bizarre, reports had for some time indicated the expansion of Daesh was indeed facilitated by Iran and Syria. For example, the Washington Post reported on June 10, 2014, the following: “Moderate rebel groups complain that Daash ’s rise has been aided by the relative disinterest shown by Syrian government forces in the areas under the group’s control, which are rarely subjected to airstrikes and bombardment. That has helped the group set up its own version of a government.”
Third, irrespective of whether one finds existing intelligence or the open sources in that regard as credible, the rise and expansion of Daesh has as a matter of fact served the interests of the Islamic regime in Iran. In other words, irrespective of Iranian intentions and schemes, the consequences of Daesh’s emergence as a formidable fighting force in Syria and, later, its expansion into Iraq has served the interests of the regime in Tehran.
Although Iran is allied with some Shiite groups in Iraq, the regime in Tehran has defined its strategic interests in Iraq in three ways. The first is to preclude the emergence of a federal democracy in Iraq that is stable and economically and politically strong enough to become a regional power with the capacity to block Iranian hegemony. Although the regime in Tehran is rhetorically committed to “friendly” relations with Iraq, it pursues a policy of divide and conquer toward its Shiite-dominated neighbor. The second strategic objective of Iran in Iraq is to make sure that democracy does not take root. In fact, Iran’s concerted effort is to make sure that democracy is associated with chaos and instability. The third Iranian strategic interest in Iraq is to undermine the Kurdistan regional government and make sure that the Kurds do not progress further. Iran is fearful of the Kurdistan regional government and its drive toward independence because of its demonstration effect on other parts of Kurdistan.
It is noteworthy that Daesh first stated that it would seize Baghdad once it consolidated itself in Mosul. However, Daesh instead attacked South Kurdistan. This came at a time when the Iraqi-Kurdish leadership called for a referendum on independence.
In short, Daesh’s expansion into Iraq, which was facilitated by Iran, the Assad regime and the Maliki government, has made Iraq even weaker and thus more amenable to Iranian control. The Iraqi army has been reduced substantially. Meanwhile, Shiite militias that answer to Iran have become the most powerful military forces in Iraq. These militias terrorize the Sunni population and thus perpetuate the sectarian conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. In fact, Daesh has helped the Shiite government in Iraq in this regard by eliminating prominent figures and tribal leaders with the Sunni community, thus making the Sunnis even more vulnerable. At the same time, the Kurdistan region’s war with Daesh has drained the limited resources of the Kurdish government, resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, several thousand dead and injured Peshmergas, as well as other dangerous consequences for Iraq at large and the Kurdistan region in particular.
In the midst of all this, there are naïve journalists, pundits and even some government officials in the Western world who have bought into the propaganda by the Iranian regime’s lobby that it is a force for “stability” in the region. The regime in Tehran, which is the major source of instability throughout the Middle East, is painted in some circles as a possible stabilizing factor in Iraq and elsewhere.
However, as recently warned by General David H. Petraeus, former commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, the strategic threat to stability, democracy and western interests in Iraq and Syria is the Iranian regime. According to Gen. Petraeus, Iran is on the verge of creating a terrorist proxy similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon, thus posing a strategic threat to the balance of power in the region.
In spite of the economic siege on South Kurdistan, the Kurdish government and the brave Peshmerga forces have managed to not only withstand the multiple military attacks by Daesh, but also to push back this terrorist group from Kurdish territory. Once Daesh is defeated, a war between the Peshmerga Forces and the militias of Iran in Iraq is likely. This is likely to start in Kirkuk and other strategically important places.
To prevent a situation where the West has to decide whether to fight a war with Iran’s proxies in Iraq, the United States and its allies should increase their support for the Kurdistan region. Only through a visible presence in combination with financial and military support for the Kurdistan region can the West undermine Iran’s drive for hegemony in the Middle East.
viernes, 13 de marzo de 2015
"A republic of the Mind"
REPUBLIC OF THE MIND
Although it was crushed soon after I left, the self-declared Republic of Iranian Kurdistan lives on for me as a republic of the mind that you can never completely destroy, writes Mark Colvin.
This is a story about five days I spent in a place that never existed.
It happened 35 years ago, on my first major assignment as a foreign correspondent.
It was five months in to the Iranian hostage crisis: just a couple of months after the events depicted in the film Argo.
April 1980.
If you've seen that film, although it bends the truth considerably as it goes on, its first half is a reasonable depiction of the chaotic, violent and utterly unpredictable atmosphere of Tehran at that time.
Then on April 24 came the US rescue raid, Operation Eagle Claw, which failed so spectacularly in the Dasht-e Kavir desert, with American aircraft crashing into each other in a sandstorm.
My cameraman Les Seymour and I covered the reaction to that, including an anti-American demonstration of an estimated half a million people when we were beaten up by young Hezbollah thugs.
After a few more days, the stories in the capital began to seem repetitive: another car bomb, another riot, but somehow nothing new to say.
Let's go and cover an actual war, was basically how the BBC correspondent Alex Brodie pitched it to me. Let's go to this place up in the north-west that's trying to make itself independent of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime.
The self-declared Republic of Iranian Kurdistan was a place that did not exist in the eyes of the country's central government, of the United Nations, or in the consciousness of most of the world.
But it was a place that had been fighting for its life since the spring of the previous year. A place whose capital had been besieged and sacked by the Iranian army, with its American equipment inherited from the Shah, but then retaken by ill-equipped Kurdish Peshmergan.
Alex's friend and interpreter, Bahram Dehqani Tafti, an Anglo-Iranian poet and teacher not long out of Oxford university, said he'd come with us and translate.
We took a plane to Tabriz, and drove towards Kurdistan with absolutely no idea what was going to happen next.
Eventually we reached a ramshackle sort of border post, an oddity given that officially there was no border: how could there be, to a place that didn't exist?
The sergeant told us to go and see his major, and detailed a young recruit to sit in the car as we drove there. He sat between me and Bahram, with his rifle between his knees, idly picking his teeth with the sight at the end of the barrel.
Don't look, said Bahram, but he's got the safety catch off.
The next five minutes on a bumpy track were spent praying he wouldn't blow his head off, in which case we'd undoubtedly get the blame.
It was the first time, but not the last, in my career that I was to reflect how closely foreign correspondent work still resembled Evelyn Waugh's great comic novel Scoop.
When we reached the major, Bahram somehow persuaded him to let us continue.
Before dusk we were in Mahabad, the capital, a neatly laid out town that bore few traces of the mighty battle to recapture it only a few months before.
What I remember, after the near anarchy of Tehran, was an aura of peace and military discipline: well-organised, neatly dressed soldiers who knew how to handle their weapons.
"A Kurd kills with one shot," one of them told me. "We have always been short of ammunition."
In Mahabad, we met the Kurds' spiritual leader, Sheikh Ezzedine Husseini, a man who had always argued for a secular republic and insisted that clergy like himself had no business running a country, and their political leader, Dr Qassemlou, a Sorbonne-educated democrat who spoke eight languages and espoused Kurdish nationalism all his life.
Then we drove south, because that's where the Iranian Army counter-attack was coming from.
We thought they were a long way off, south of Sanandaj, but before we got to Saqqez, halfway there, a helicopter gunship rose over a bluff about 100 metres away, its heavy machine gun pointed straight at us. It hovered for what seemed like an hour but was probably a minute, then peeled away.
I was congratulating myself on my own coolness not long after when we stopped. Then I got out off the car and my knees literally gave way. I was on the ground in a heap. Your body tells the truth about fear, even when you try to lie.
We got to Saqqez and debated whether to go on. There was a convoy leaving for Sanandaj straight away, and maybe not another till the next day.
We erred on the side of caution and sat talking to local Kurdish leaders, drinking small cups of this sweet coffee and smoking. We wondered if we should have just gone on in the convoy. Then a man, white-faced and shaking, came in and started talking to the chief. The remnants of the convoy we would have taken were on their way back.
We filmed the damaged trucks that had survived, the survivors and the charred bodies of the dead. An air-to ground rocket attack is an ugly thing.
I've seldom felt so remote from the world. We got lost on the way back to Mahabad, in the dead of night. We pulled into a hamlet and asked the way. It was the provincial capital, after all. "I've heard of it," came the unhelpful reply.
We found it the next morning.
Eventually we got back to Tabriz, then to Tehran. Two days later, on his way to my hotel to translate and transcribe the interviews, Bahram Dehqani Tafti was pulled over, driven to Evin prison, and murdered.
Sanandaj soon fell, then Saqqez. Mahabad held on a long time, but it fell, too. Sheikh Ezzedine spent his last 20 years in Swedish exile. Dr Qassemlou went into exile too, and Iranian government agents assassinated him in Vienna in 1989. No-one was ever charged.
Iranian Kurdistan never existed for the world. Neither Iran nor the big powers have ever wanted a Kurdish state: not in Iran, Iraq, Syria or Turkey, regardless of who's in power.
But it has lived on for me, always there, when I saw how Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds just over the border in Halabja, and now when I see ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa and driven at huge cost out of Kobane.
It wasn't a Utopia, just a reasonable attempt at a decent autonomous state, and although it was crushed, it lives on for me in a parallel reality, a republic of the mind of the sort that you can never completely crush.
This is an edited version of a speech delivered at the Melbourne Town Hall at a night of storytelling to mark the 5th anniversary of the Wheeler Centre, on the theme "Five".
Mark Colvin is the presenter of ABC Radio's current affairs program PM.
http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-16/colvin-a-republic-of-the-mind-my-visit-to-iranian-kurdistan/6115558
Although it was crushed soon after I left, the self-declared Republic of Iranian Kurdistan lives on for me as a republic of the mind that you can never completely destroy, writes Mark Colvin.
This is a story about five days I spent in a place that never existed.
It happened 35 years ago, on my first major assignment as a foreign correspondent.
It was five months in to the Iranian hostage crisis: just a couple of months after the events depicted in the film Argo.
April 1980.
If you've seen that film, although it bends the truth considerably as it goes on, its first half is a reasonable depiction of the chaotic, violent and utterly unpredictable atmosphere of Tehran at that time.
Then on April 24 came the US rescue raid, Operation Eagle Claw, which failed so spectacularly in the Dasht-e Kavir desert, with American aircraft crashing into each other in a sandstorm.
My cameraman Les Seymour and I covered the reaction to that, including an anti-American demonstration of an estimated half a million people when we were beaten up by young Hezbollah thugs.
After a few more days, the stories in the capital began to seem repetitive: another car bomb, another riot, but somehow nothing new to say.
Let's go and cover an actual war, was basically how the BBC correspondent Alex Brodie pitched it to me. Let's go to this place up in the north-west that's trying to make itself independent of Ayatollah Khomeini's regime.
The self-declared Republic of Iranian Kurdistan was a place that did not exist in the eyes of the country's central government, of the United Nations, or in the consciousness of most of the world.
But it was a place that had been fighting for its life since the spring of the previous year. A place whose capital had been besieged and sacked by the Iranian army, with its American equipment inherited from the Shah, but then retaken by ill-equipped Kurdish Peshmergan.
Alex's friend and interpreter, Bahram Dehqani Tafti, an Anglo-Iranian poet and teacher not long out of Oxford university, said he'd come with us and translate.
We took a plane to Tabriz, and drove towards Kurdistan with absolutely no idea what was going to happen next.
Eventually we reached a ramshackle sort of border post, an oddity given that officially there was no border: how could there be, to a place that didn't exist?
The sergeant told us to go and see his major, and detailed a young recruit to sit in the car as we drove there. He sat between me and Bahram, with his rifle between his knees, idly picking his teeth with the sight at the end of the barrel.
Don't look, said Bahram, but he's got the safety catch off.
The next five minutes on a bumpy track were spent praying he wouldn't blow his head off, in which case we'd undoubtedly get the blame.
It was the first time, but not the last, in my career that I was to reflect how closely foreign correspondent work still resembled Evelyn Waugh's great comic novel Scoop.
When we reached the major, Bahram somehow persuaded him to let us continue.
Before dusk we were in Mahabad, the capital, a neatly laid out town that bore few traces of the mighty battle to recapture it only a few months before.
What I remember, after the near anarchy of Tehran, was an aura of peace and military discipline: well-organised, neatly dressed soldiers who knew how to handle their weapons.
"A Kurd kills with one shot," one of them told me. "We have always been short of ammunition."
In Mahabad, we met the Kurds' spiritual leader, Sheikh Ezzedine Husseini, a man who had always argued for a secular republic and insisted that clergy like himself had no business running a country, and their political leader, Dr Qassemlou, a Sorbonne-educated democrat who spoke eight languages and espoused Kurdish nationalism all his life.
Then we drove south, because that's where the Iranian Army counter-attack was coming from.
We thought they were a long way off, south of Sanandaj, but before we got to Saqqez, halfway there, a helicopter gunship rose over a bluff about 100 metres away, its heavy machine gun pointed straight at us. It hovered for what seemed like an hour but was probably a minute, then peeled away.
I was congratulating myself on my own coolness not long after when we stopped. Then I got out off the car and my knees literally gave way. I was on the ground in a heap. Your body tells the truth about fear, even when you try to lie.
We got to Saqqez and debated whether to go on. There was a convoy leaving for Sanandaj straight away, and maybe not another till the next day.
We erred on the side of caution and sat talking to local Kurdish leaders, drinking small cups of this sweet coffee and smoking. We wondered if we should have just gone on in the convoy. Then a man, white-faced and shaking, came in and started talking to the chief. The remnants of the convoy we would have taken were on their way back.
We filmed the damaged trucks that had survived, the survivors and the charred bodies of the dead. An air-to ground rocket attack is an ugly thing.
I've seldom felt so remote from the world. We got lost on the way back to Mahabad, in the dead of night. We pulled into a hamlet and asked the way. It was the provincial capital, after all. "I've heard of it," came the unhelpful reply.
We found it the next morning.
Eventually we got back to Tabriz, then to Tehran. Two days later, on his way to my hotel to translate and transcribe the interviews, Bahram Dehqani Tafti was pulled over, driven to Evin prison, and murdered.
Sanandaj soon fell, then Saqqez. Mahabad held on a long time, but it fell, too. Sheikh Ezzedine spent his last 20 years in Swedish exile. Dr Qassemlou went into exile too, and Iranian government agents assassinated him in Vienna in 1989. No-one was ever charged.
Iranian Kurdistan never existed for the world. Neither Iran nor the big powers have ever wanted a Kurdish state: not in Iran, Iraq, Syria or Turkey, regardless of who's in power.
But it has lived on for me, always there, when I saw how Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds just over the border in Halabja, and now when I see ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa and driven at huge cost out of Kobane.
It wasn't a Utopia, just a reasonable attempt at a decent autonomous state, and although it was crushed, it lives on for me in a parallel reality, a republic of the mind of the sort that you can never completely crush.
This is an edited version of a speech delivered at the Melbourne Town Hall at a night of storytelling to mark the 5th anniversary of the Wheeler Centre, on the theme "Five".
Mark Colvin is the presenter of ABC Radio's current affairs program PM.
http://mobile.abc.net.au/news/2015-02-16/colvin-a-republic-of-the-mind-my-visit-to-iranian-kurdistan/6115558
Remembering Sheikh Ezzaddin Hosseini
A SHORT BIOGRAPHY OF SHEIKH EZADDIN HOSSEINI
http://rojhelat.info/en/?p=8223
The characteristic Sheikh Ezaddin Hosseini (in Kurdish Şêx Êzedîn Hisênî) who was famous for its national and religious role, lost his life due to illness four years ago in a hospital in Sweden. This is a short presentation of his character. He was born in 1921 in the city Bane, East of Kurdistan (Rojhelat). He grow up in a religious family.
Sheikh Ezaddin and his father performed a constant struggle and process against Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was in power in Iran during that time. He also had a close and continuous contact with Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji (in Kurdish, Şêx Mehmud Berzencî) who was a Kurdish leader in town Silêmanî in Southern Kurdistan.
Despite of being a religious person, however he joined a Kurdish political community (JêKaf, Komeley Jiyanewey Kurdistan) as a member in Bokan city in 1943. After the Iranian revolution overthrew in 1979, fled the leader Reza Shah. During this time it was Kurdistan for a short time under control, and neither the Iranian forces or the government had no control of the Rojhelat. He was elected as a member of the Kurdistan diplomatic representative groups in order to negotiate with the new next in the Iranian regime, and he was elected as the all Kurdish political passenger portions and the people of Kurdistan. He was actively attended almost all the meetings with the Iranian regime existing rights of the Kurds in Rojhelat and Iran.
After the massacre and the bloody crimes of the Iranian regime in Sine in 1979, he attended a meeting with the regime’s leaders, Rafsanjani, Bani Sadr, Beheshti and Taleghani. He asked, what is the difference between a crown and a turban? Where he answer that they do not exist any difference, but that the crown has been replaced with a turban, they was no change and nothing has changed in reality, they both are same to the Kurds. After some ongoing and regular meetings with the Iranian regime, he pronounced that because of the lack of clarity about containing and quality of those authorities and the Iranian regime promised to the Kurdish parties, and Kurds decided to boycott the referendum of the Iranian Islamic regime.
About a month later, he was invited by the Iranian regime to a meeting in Tehran and Qom, during the journey to meet Khomeini, the Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and a number of officials in the Iranian Islamist regime. After Khomeini’s declaration of Jihad against Kurdish nation in November 1979, Sheikh with many fighters went to Kurdistan mountains.
Later on, because the Iranian governments responded Kurdish demand for freedom and their rights by attacks, mass killings and massacres, Sheikh Ezaddin invited Kurdish people to join the fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, Thousands of Kurds in Rojhelat joined the Kurdish freedom fighters to protect themselves and fight for their rights and freedom.
In 1985 he went towards the border of South Kurdistan mountains and continued his struggling. Finally, he went to Sweden in 1990. Again he continued his national campaign for Kurdish question and played an important role in the establishment of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK).
Sheikh Ezaddin died on February 10, 2011, in “Akademiska sjukhuset” a hospital in Uppsala, city of Sweden
http://rojhelat.info/en/?p=8223
The characteristic Sheikh Ezaddin Hosseini (in Kurdish Şêx Êzedîn Hisênî) who was famous for its national and religious role, lost his life due to illness four years ago in a hospital in Sweden. This is a short presentation of his character. He was born in 1921 in the city Bane, East of Kurdistan (Rojhelat). He grow up in a religious family.
Sheikh Ezaddin and his father performed a constant struggle and process against Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was in power in Iran during that time. He also had a close and continuous contact with Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji (in Kurdish, Şêx Mehmud Berzencî) who was a Kurdish leader in town Silêmanî in Southern Kurdistan.
Despite of being a religious person, however he joined a Kurdish political community (JêKaf, Komeley Jiyanewey Kurdistan) as a member in Bokan city in 1943. After the Iranian revolution overthrew in 1979, fled the leader Reza Shah. During this time it was Kurdistan for a short time under control, and neither the Iranian forces or the government had no control of the Rojhelat. He was elected as a member of the Kurdistan diplomatic representative groups in order to negotiate with the new next in the Iranian regime, and he was elected as the all Kurdish political passenger portions and the people of Kurdistan. He was actively attended almost all the meetings with the Iranian regime existing rights of the Kurds in Rojhelat and Iran.
After the massacre and the bloody crimes of the Iranian regime in Sine in 1979, he attended a meeting with the regime’s leaders, Rafsanjani, Bani Sadr, Beheshti and Taleghani. He asked, what is the difference between a crown and a turban? Where he answer that they do not exist any difference, but that the crown has been replaced with a turban, they was no change and nothing has changed in reality, they both are same to the Kurds. After some ongoing and regular meetings with the Iranian regime, he pronounced that because of the lack of clarity about containing and quality of those authorities and the Iranian regime promised to the Kurdish parties, and Kurds decided to boycott the referendum of the Iranian Islamic regime.
About a month later, he was invited by the Iranian regime to a meeting in Tehran and Qom, during the journey to meet Khomeini, the Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and a number of officials in the Iranian Islamist regime. After Khomeini’s declaration of Jihad against Kurdish nation in November 1979, Sheikh with many fighters went to Kurdistan mountains.
Later on, because the Iranian governments responded Kurdish demand for freedom and their rights by attacks, mass killings and massacres, Sheikh Ezaddin invited Kurdish people to join the fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, Thousands of Kurds in Rojhelat joined the Kurdish freedom fighters to protect themselves and fight for their rights and freedom.
In 1985 he went towards the border of South Kurdistan mountains and continued his struggling. Finally, he went to Sweden in 1990. Again he continued his national campaign for Kurdish question and played an important role in the establishment of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK).
Sheikh Ezaddin died on February 10, 2011, in “Akademiska sjukhuset” a hospital in Uppsala, city of Sweden
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