Ghassemlou’s Widow: ‘I Know Very Well That Iran Killed My Husband’
By Deniz Serinci 9/7/2014
COPENHAGEN, Denmark - Twenty five years ago, when Kurdish-Iranian leader Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was shot dead by suspected agents of the Islamic Republic in Vienna, it took his widow all her strength to bear the news.
"I did not believe it. I thought I was asleep and it was all a nightmare,” Helen Krulich told Rudaw. “If I had had a bad heart I would have suffered a heart attack,” she said of the day on July 13, 1989 when she lost her husband.
Ghassemlou, secretary general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran (PDKI), was killed in a Vienna flat where he was in secret talks with representatives of the Islamic Republic.
The 81-year old Krulich, also known by her Kurdish name of Nasrin, was in Paris when she heard the news. A PDKI friend called her to say that the man she had been married to for 37 years was dead.
The rendezvous in Vienna, in which Ghassemlou was accompanied by two associates -- Fadhil Rassoul and Abdullah Ghaderi Azar – had come after several such meetings had already taken place.
"The meeting was about stopping the war in Kurdistan,” his widow said. “Ghassemlou welcomed the meetings because he had always been against the war."
Two men, introduced as journalists, shot and killed Ghassemlou and his two friends during the meeting.
Austrian police arrested the two suspects, revealed to be diplomats assigned to the Iranian Embassy in Vienna. The Austrians allowed them to leave for Tehran. When, four months later an Austrian court issued arrest warrants, the suspects were gone.
In September 1992 Ghassemlou’s successor to the PDKI, Sadegh Sharafkandi, was also killed by two gunmen at a restaurant in Berlin, along with three companions.
Krulich and PDKI protested against the Austrian authorities and launched a campaign against the Iranian government, but without much effect.
“In 1990, I began legal proceedings against the government in Vienna. But two years later the Austrian Supreme Court rejected my lawsuit,” Krulich said. “I felt defeated and alone. It was a very difficult time for me.”
But she is grateful for the support of many at that time, including the former French first lady Danielle Mitterand.
Mitterrand was known as a good friend of Ghassemlou, and declared after the assassination that the French Embassy in Vienna was to serve as "The embassy of the Kurds." She had Ghassemlou’s body transported to Paris, where the Kurdish leader was buried.
Krulich said that the government of mullahs in Iran should be overthrown.
“The regime does what they want and ignores protests by Kurds and the international community. Therefore, the regime has lost legitimacy," she said.
The Kurds are one of the largest minorities in Iran, with an estimated eight million population. But they have no legal political party in the country, and Kurdish education in public schools is not allowed. The Kurds have often been in conflict with the government in Tehran over the right to self-government, as well as cultural and linguistic rights.
Krulich believes that the solution is a new democratic Iran, with autonomy or federation for ethnic minorities, including the Kurds. “It will create equality for all groups in Iran and it was also what Ghassemlou fought for."
Krulich remembers the early 1980s, when PDKI Peshmerga forces were locked in a war with the Iranian regime, and controlled several areas of the country’s Kurdish regions in western Iran.
The Czech-born Krulich joined her husband in the Kurdish mountains and taught English to a classroom of Peshmergas. Besides her native Czech, she also speaks Kurdish, Persian, English and French.
Although the assassinations are history, 25 years after the murder suspects in the Ghassemlou case have still not been brought to justice. But the Iranian Kurdish leader’s legacy lives on, Krulich stressed.
“They killed my husband, but not his legacy as a leader of PDKI. The idea about freedom still lives on among millions of Kurds.”
Iran still denies being involved in the killings.
"I know very well that Iran killed my husband," his widow said
sábado, 31 de enero de 2015
Some photos
The following links have some more photos and travel accounts of E.K.:
http://askgudmundsen.travellerspoint.com/47/
http://www.heartmybackpack.com/blog/kurdistan-iran/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/solo-travel/10560739/Inside-Iran-the-Kurdish-of-Hawraman.html
http://askgudmundsen.travellerspoint.com/47/
http://www.heartmybackpack.com/blog/kurdistan-iran/
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/solo-travel/10560739/Inside-Iran-the-Kurdish-of-Hawraman.html
Robert Baer on Iran
Robert Baer, author and CIA veteran, gives his analysis of Iran and its role in the Middle East.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/interviews/baer.html
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Robert Baer was a CIA case officer in the Directorate of Operations from 1976 to 1997, where he served in Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq and Lebanon. He is the author of See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Crown Publishers, 2002). Here, Baer says that there is evidence linking Iran to attacks on American interests, including the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 U.S. soldiers in 1996. He says that Iran has been mishandled by U.S. diplomats since the 1980s and that American foreign policy regarding the Islamic Republic is based on myths and misinformation. Baer was interviewed by FRONTLINE producer Neil Docherty on March 22, 2002.
... Maybe you could paint me a political picture of Lebanon in the 1980s, when you first got there. What was happening?
When I first went to Lebanon, it was in December 1982. A seminal event had occurred about six months before I got there, and that was the kidnapping of three Iranian diplomats, the charge d'affaires, and a Lebanese translator. They were murdered and they were buried in a Lebanese forces parking lot -- that's the Christian Lebanese forces -- in a part of Beirut. What we didn't realize as Americans, because we didn't understand Iran, is we were going to get blamed for that kidnapping.
The way it went down is the Iranians assumed, since the Lebanese Christian forces were our allies and the allies of Israel, that we had to be responsible for those kidnappings and the murders later. ... Even though we knew nothing about it -- the CIA didn't know about it, American government didn't know about it, we ourselves were asking what happened to these people -- for the Iranians, it was a key event which for them broke the contract.
So they started kidnapping, and shortly after that they kidnapped David Dodge, the acting president of the American University of Beirut and took him to Tehran. They got caught. We found out about it. We went to the Syrians; the Syrians forced his release. After [Dodge] was released, the Iranians then arranged to use surrogates in order to have plausible denial. ... They used the Hezbollah, a group in Hezbollah, to kidnap hostages.
Why do you think the Iranians were taken and killed?
Maybe it was for robbery. We don't know. We're not sure. ...
How, at that time, are the Iranians looking at the world?
First of all, you've got to look at the 6 June invasion of Lebanon. The Israelis came across the border because of an Abu Nidal assassination attempt in London. For the Iranians, it looked as a pretext for Israel to attack an Islamic country, and they looked at Lebanon as an Islamic country, or a country that should be an Islamic country. So they looked at this as Israeli aggression, but backed by the United States. They simply do not believe that Israel invaded Lebanon without a green light from Washington. I don't know about a green light. Maybe there was, maybe there wasn't. But the point is, the Iranians held us responsible.
... [Then the kidnapping of] these three Iranian diplomats. Not only did they kidnap three Iranian diplomats, but the charge d'affaires ... is very close to [then-President] Rafsanjani. They're almost related. ... He takes it personally. The Iranian government holds the Lebanese forces and the United States responsible.
So you have these two events. And Iran says, "All right, we're at war. Undeclared war, but nonetheless we're at war." Their objective at that point is to drive the Americans out of Lebanon.
The first embassy bombing [in April 1983] I think they were involved in; the Marine [barracks] bombing in October 1983; September 1984, the second embassy bombing. And you know what? The Americans [then] leave. This is a successful policy for them [the bombers]. And what comes in place [after that]? Hezbollah is found in 1985. It's an alternative to the Lebanese government; it's an Islamic party. It mirrors the government in Tehran. ... And then you add on to this that Hezbollah drives Israel out of Lebanon, the first victory against the Israelis ever.
So what we have today, if you want to expand this analysis, [is] Hamas, the Islamic Jihad in Palestine and Gaza carrying out war successfully against Sharon. And the Iranians back in Tehran say, "We're winning. This is the way you fight a war. This is how you defeat F-16s, this is how you defeat aircraft carriers. We beat the United States, we beat the Israelis in Lebanon, and we're going to beat 'em in Palestine."
This is a strong message. I don't care how secular Iran becomes. They still look at the United States, Britain, and France as colonizing powers, and this is the final war ending colonization in the Middle East, using Islam. So for the Iranians, it's very, very logical. We as Americans say, "Well, it's not. We were peacekeepers in Lebanon." They don't look at it that way. Or as Americans, we say, "You can't kidnap innocent people, journalists, priests, people like that. It's wrong." They look at it differently. It's a war of civilizations for them. And it was very successful, frankly, and cheap.
Right. And what about Iranian fingerprints on Hezbollah? What is the evidence that Iran influenced Hezbollah?
Well, we know they influenced Hezbollah because they accept Khomeini and Khamenei as the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, [not Sheik] Fadlallah. Fadlallah is the senior cleric in Lebanon, but he was not the main impetus of Hezbollah. It was Iran. I mean, it's acknowledged; it's public that the religious authority is found in Qom in Iran, and the Iranian clerics. It's a very hierarchical religion.
The fingerprints on Iran in terrorism? There are a few of them. The Marines [bombing of the Marine barracks in October 1983], kidnapping of Charlie Glass, the American journalist, the death of Bill Buckley [the CIA station chief who was kidnapped in March 1984] , the fact that Dodge, the American University of Beirut acting president, was held in Iran in a prison, kidnapped by the Pasdaran [Iran's Revolutionary Guards].
The evidence is there. The fact that Father [Martin] Jenco saw Iranians deliver food to the place he was held in the Bekaa Valley, that was in 1984, I think. The evidence is just there. I mean, it's incontrovertible when you have a hostage seeing the people, you're watching this stuff by satellite, and you've got this intelligence information. And I think the only people that would deny this are people who haven't really followed the issue, or just made up their minds otherwise.
Or Iran itself -- it certainly claims it doesn't [and] won't sponsor terrorism.
The fact is, in 1984 and 1985, they were in control of the Sheik Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek. I saw with my own eyes, journalists saw with their own eyes, that the Pasdaran was guarding the places where the hostages were held. When [Jerry] Levin escaped, he escaped out of one of the buildings at the Sheik Abdullah barracks. They saw the Iranians deliver the food. It's just denying reality. The Iranians can't say, "We didn't know anything about it." It's crazy.
Fast-forwarding to today, what's your impression or your knowledge about their support for Islamic Jihad?
Early in the 1990s, they supported it. They provided training, weapons in the Bekaa Valley, supported morally. They've stated publicly they support these guys, the Qods force, which is part of the Pasdaran.
What they're doing today, I don't know. The Israelis claim that an agreement was made between Arafat and the Pasdaran in Moscow six months ago. I don't know. ... I don't trust the Israelis. They're in the middle of this fight. I no longer do intelligence. I have no way to measure the facts from propaganda. I think the Israelis would know. But are they going to tell us the truth? Who knows?
What about Buckley? Can you expand a little on what happened -- why he was taken, and what happened to him?
Buckley, the Iranians knew who he was. When he would go to the airport at Beirut International Airport and send visitors to the United States with intelligence connections, it was very clear. He lived in one apartment, always wore a suit, always meticulously dressed, always left at the same time. For the Iranians or their surrogates, the token surrogates who took him, he was a very attractive target.
You could get the ambassador; it would be great for the Iranians, but he was too hard to get. He had protection and an armored car. Buckley didn't. He was held for a while in Beirut and taken to the Sheik Abdullah Barracks where he was held. The winter of, I believe it was 1984-1985, he caught pneumonia. He'd been really roughed up, beaten up, tortured during interrogation. Combination of pneumonia and torture; his whole system collapsed, and he died in captivity.
Doesn't do much for Iran-American relations, does it?
No. Well, I mean, the Iranians have their case of the shah, the overthrow of [nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad] Mossadeq, the corruption of American companies and bribing people in Iran, our feting the shah, overlooking human rights violations. It was during the Cold War. And the Iranians say, "Well, so what if it was during the Cold War? You supported the dictator, you kept him in power." Washington's argument's going to be, "Well, we didn't keep him power. He was the Shah of Iran. He was there before we ever got involved. Iranians kept him in power because they tolerated his behavior."
There are cases for both sides. I have my own feelings, you know. I just don't think that you should attack innocents, like the World Trade Center. It's not the Western way. But my opinions are irrelevant in this. We have to look at it from the Iranian standpoint, why they did [the things they did] ... and what they want. ...
In the Middle East, it's about a people, the Arabs and the Iranians, who feel humiliated from the 19th century. It's got nothing to do with the United States. But all of a sudden in 1948, the United States inherited all these colonial problems. It inherited the Gulf from Britain in 1970. But we weren't capable of managing an empire in the Middle East. It's just not the American way. So we tweaked something here, send money, send troops.
And now we're dealing it militarily, which you can't solve this problem [militarily]. ... Afghanistan's been a failure so far. ... [W]e are gradually moving into a war unconsciously against Islam -- which you don't want to do. There's just too many people, there's too many countries. They own the oil, most of the world's oil resources, and hope we sidestep this.
But it's not because of the ill will of the White House, the State Department, or the CIA. It's a basic misunderstanding of what's happening in the Middle East, and it doesn't have to do with Democrats or Republicans. And one side is support for Israel -- that's the way [others] perceive it. ...
And how important is Israel in American foreign policy?
It's extremely important. But it's because we look at Israel as a democracy, one. ... And the Holocaust is very important in the American conscience, political conscience. It's a gut reaction. We support Israel for those two reasons, the Holocaust and democracy.
And Americans say, "Why can't the Arabs see this?" The Arabs, on the other hand, are saying, "We're not responsible for the Holocaust. We protected the Jews during the Second World War. They fled there. We didn't bother them. They are the ones that set up a country."
And then the more radicalized [the] Muslims become, the more they look at [Israel] as a colonial appendage of the United States that is meant to oppress them. The terms of their dialogue are being degraded by the day, too. And so [you get] these people that ran the airplanes into the World Trade Center, saying, "The West is hostile to us, and we've got to fight it."
But at the moment, we're talking war on terror.
Well, that's a mistake, because yes, it is war on terror. But we are going to need the Muslims to fight this war on terror. We need Saudi Arabia; we need to make Saudi Arabia feel comfortable. We need Saudi Arabia to go back to its schools and reform them and stop preaching jihad. We need Saudi Arabia to join the 21st century, give jobs to these people equally, and cut back on the corruption ... start giving these people in the south, Asir province, where the suicide bombers came from, a stake in life. But we can't do it with bombs. ...
And how important [is] Hezbollah? ...
It's extremely important. Hezbollah's divided into many parties. There's the Islamic Resistance in the south, which beat the Israelis. They attacked the Israeli army. They defeated the Israeli army on Lebanese soil. I do not know how we can describe that other than a national liberation movement.
I don't agree that Hezbollah itself is a terrorist organization. It delivers powdered milk; it takes care of people. It's a social organization; it's a political organization. It fights corruption.
Then there's the Islamic Resistance, which is an army, which is a guerrilla force, fighting for control of its own country. And then, under the Hezbollah umbrella, was the Islamic Jihad, which I call their special security, which was controlled by Iran, which carried out terrorism against the West. And you can paint Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. You can do that for political reasons, but strictly speaking, it is many things. Just as [with] the IRA, you got Sinn Fein and you've got the real IRA, which is conducting terrorism.
And is the distinction important?
It's very important.
Why?
Well, I mean if you're going to retaliate against terrorism -- what we call terrorism, [which is] the attacking of innocent people for political motives, not liberating your own country -- we have to distinguish the two groups. Fadlallah is not a terrorist. ... He was a spiritual leader in his organization. ... We can't label him a terrorist and fight Hezbollah as an organization in its entirety. We have to isolate the murderers and fight them.
But when [Hezbollah] was taking American hostages...
It wasn't Hezbollah; it was the Islamic Jihad organization which was taking [hostages]. It was a very distinct organization, which was separate from Hezbollah because you had the consultative council which only had a vague idea of what the hostage-takers were doing. The hostage-takers were taking orders from Iran. Hezbollah itself does not care about American citizens running around Lebanon, as it doesn't care today. I mean, as an ex-CIA officer, I can go see Hezbollah, I can talk to them. They don't care. ...
But explain that there is actually a different management structure here [that] we're talking [about]?
Absolutely. And it's very clear that special security in Hezbollah took its orders for all the important years from the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [in Iran]. Hezbollah itself accepted money and spiritual leadership from Iran, but it had nothing to do with terrorism. Ninety-nine percent of Hezbollah, people in Hezbollah, know nothing about it. They don't have the slightest idea how it works, who's behind it -- the Iranian role. And that nuance, I think, is missed in Washington today.
I think it's a mistake in U.S. foreign policy, first of all, to paint Islam as an enemy, because you get dragged into a cultural war which we can't win. You have to isolate the people who really do sponsor mass murder or kidnappings or individual murders of people, that are killing Americans in Kuwait today, that flew the airplanes in. Those are isolated individuals which don't have anything to do with Islam in general. Same way in Hezbollah. It's a small group of people kidnapping, murdering. But Hezbollah itself is not a terrorist organization.
And what about Iran? In that context, how worried should we be about Iran?
Well, if you drive Iran into the corner, Iran has the means to retaliate all it wants. ... Iran -- if it feels it's backed into the corner, it's at war again with the United States -- will resort to terrorism, because the people who were involved are still in Iran. They're free. They don't agree with the policies, [with] the way Iran's going now. They think there should be more attacks against Americans. Where they're going to be depends on how we treat them.
In that context, how did you respond to the State of the Union address and the "axis of evil" speech?
Well, that's American politics. I think the United States has no intention of attacking Iran or provoking Iran. ...
But was it a wise selection of words?
I think Iran has been mishandled by the United States since the 1980s, since 1979. We should have determined responsibility for taking over that embassy. It was an act of war, and we should have responded accordingly. By not responding to taking over that embassy in a graduated fashion, by that dumb hostage rescue thing, by not responding to that, we only encouraged people who advocated terrorism in Iran. And it wasn't the whole country that did [advocated terrorism].
We should have dealt with that, nation to nation, state to state. They violated sovereign law of the United States. So it's a series of mistakes. But now, to paint Iran as this evil country, we don't know what's going to happen, because we don't know what's happening in Iran. Will this encourage the moderates to change Iranian policy? I don't know. ...
Do you feel America doesn't know Iran?
No, it doesn't know anything about it. Doesn't know anything about it. I have seen no dialogue in this country, in the press, or in academia to suggest to me that we really know what's going on in Iran. We are dealing with myths, misinformation, a press that has no idea. It boils down to women's rights or wishful thinking about Khatami or misperceptions.
As a professional intelligence person, how would you rate American intelligence in Iran?
It's lousy ... because we don't have any people in Iran. You really need people on the ground in a country to give you ground truth. You complement that with other intelligence from other countries, from technical intelligence, and you can get a good picture. But once you don't have people on the ground, you really lose track of what's happening in a country.
I mean, North Korea has always been a black hole for us, because we don't have people there. We don't have people talking to the North Koreans. You have to hear people complain about the price of milk, you have to hear people. How do they view the United States? It's very important to get a feel for a country. I mean, I lost track of the United States because I was gone for so many years, and I'm an American. ...
Tell me about [Imad Mughniyah] and his importance.
He's very important but there's certain myths about him -- that he's running the whole thing, he's the master. There are no master terrorists. They're just a whole group of people. He's very effective, very efficient. He runs commando-style operations. He's got incredible security. He can tap people, go where he wants, change IDs. He was involved in many kidnappings. I'm not sure he was involved in the first embassy bombing; he probably was, but I know that from inference. It's very hard to pin these people down, because it takes patience. But anyhow, Mughniyah is very important. He's an important player, is involved in all sorts of terrorism operations.
What's his relationship to Iran?
He was paid by Iran. He had direct connection with a couple of Iranians. ... He was recruited in the Islamic Jihad movement in 1982-1983, like that, and agreed to carry out operations against United States. He's a believer, undoubtedly. But most of all, he's very effective. He can compartment[alize] operations, he's got people that are loyal. He's ruthless and he's ready to lose people. He's ready for himself to die, too, which makes him a formidable opponent. ...
Mughniyah is a professional terrorist. I've never heard an explanation [of] what really makes the guy tick. But it was very clear to us in the 1980s that he took his orders directly from [Iran's] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. ... He was paid by them, he took orders, he put out communiqués. Occasionally he would do things on his own, when he'd get angry about something. He was an independent player. He was probably a nightmare to run for the Iranians, but he carried out their orders. And I don't think there's anybody in the American intelligence community [who] would disagree with that. ...
What do you do with Iran when you're posturing against Iraq, when it's likely you may be taking some action against Iraq? If you're a CIA intelligence expert in the region, you must be getting a little worried about how we handle all this.
... What you have to do is put yourself in the position of the Iranians. ... An invasion of Iraq is going to cause resentment in the Islamic world, which is going to help the radicals in Tehran, who are going to say, "Listen, we told you all along. It's the United States against Islam. Stop this reformist stuff and let's liberate Jerusalem." ...
What about the Iran-Iraq war and America's position on that? How important is that?
It's very important. Iraq was under threat. The Reagan administration knew that if Iraq was overrun by Iran, there'd be total chaos in the Gulf. We provided help to Iraq during the war -- material help and information help -- which was extremely helpful to the Iraqis. The problem is, it built up resentment in Iran because the radicals said, "Look, they've always been against us. We've got to stop this." ...
What are the current links, do you think, between Iran and terrorism? How would you characterize or summarize it currently?
... Last thing I saw before I left the CIA was this intention to set up a relationship with bin Laden. There was a meeting which occurred in July 1996 in Afghanistan, where the Iranians went in to propose a strategic comprehensive alliance against the United States. And what that involved, whether it came to fruition or not, I don't know. In 1996, that was their intention. And that after that, anything I have to say is pure speculation. ...
Iran and the Taliban were not friends, right?
In the Middle East, my enemy's enemy is my friend. Just don't ever forget that rule. ...
[But] other than what you've said, we haven't really heard of any direct links with Al Qaeda. I guess the last one was they were letting some [Al Qaeda fugitives] escape into Iran. But we're not suggesting that Iran's fingerprints were on Sept. 11.
No. How would we ever know, though? Again, put yourself in the position of the Iranians, or an Iranian. Maybe not Iran as a state, maybe it's an individual Iranian that's carrying on this war. Would you convey these by telephone, by Internet, a decision to participate in Sept. 11? It's done orally, face to face, probably outside, so there's no room audio.
So we'll never know. It's just one of those questions we'll never know because the people involved will never talk. They don't keep a record of it. They don't need to submit receipts on their tax forms at the end of the year. We'll just never know. ...
And take me back to Khobar Towers. What do we know about Khobar Towers and Iran?
We know Iran was involved. We know Iran trained, gave alias passports, helped provide surveillance of American facilities in Saudi Arabia, and that Khomeini gave a fatwa to blow up Khobar. This has been acknowledged in the indictment, it's been acknowledged by Louis Freeh in The New Yorker.
Saudi Arabia didn't want to look too closely into it, because at that point, there was a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and they certainly didn't want to indict Iran. It was another terrorism attack that was passed over. It was overlooked because we didn't want to do anything against Iran.
Iran is the third rail of American foreign policy in the world. Brought down Jimmy Carter, Iranian crisis, and almost brought down Reagan, almost, close, with Iran-Contra. So every president since then says, "Iran is bad, but we're not going to do anything about it. It's a sleeping dog, don't wake it up."
And along comes the latest president, George W. [Bush], and he strongly intimates we are going to do something about it, this evil empire.
What can we do about it? We can only cope with these problems inasmuch as we solve the problem of Israel and Palestine. If we can implement U.N. Resolution 242, we can internationalize Jerusalem, do something about the right of return of Palestinians to Palestine. And then go to the Middle East and say, "All right, now it's time to implement other U.N. resolutions." ... But it really does boil down to Israel, in a lot of ways. ...
And when you were in the CIA, was there an awareness of this? ...
No, but it's not CIA's business. These are the politics we saw, but we were never involved in this. We never had to worry about resolutions, U.N. 242. I mean, [we] read about it and cared about it. And I know when it was passed and I know this dialogue's always been going on between Syria and United States, Lebanon.
Our objective was to find out who was taking hostages in Lebanon, who blew up our embassy, who blew up the Marines -- and predict future attacks. At the same time, we were listening to our agents, people on the ground. That's how we spent our entire life.
... When we began, you mentioned the misunderstanding about the Iranians being killed in Lebanon. ... It struck me when you were saying that, that the relationship between America and Iran seems to be one completely fostered on misunderstandings of this sort. ...
... Yes, the misunderstandings go back to Mossadeq. [Editor's note: Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, who wanted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and limit foreign involvement in Iran's internal affairs, was removed from office in a CIA-supported coup in 1953, which allowed the shah -- who was friendly to Western powers -- to return to Tehran. See the timeline for more background on Iran's history.]
The Iranians are generally, as people, pro-American. A lot of Iranians live here. The Iranian music industry is based in Los Angeles. There's a lot of travel back and forth. The Iranians have been normally in history pro-Israel as a balance to the Arabs.
But along came Mossadeq. And then you had the corruption in Tehran, all the American companies, this supplying of arms to Iran to fight the Cold War, all the military bases. The Iranians looked at this as if we were participating in the corruption of their society, American companies and American government. And then you had the revolution and then you had the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, which split off from the revolution, and a lot of them set up in the United States.
Then you had the Iran-Iraq war, and then our continued support to Israel. And the Iranians look at us as a hostile country, just as we look at the Soviet Union as a hostile country. ... There was a lot of misperceptions. And there's no dialogue.
So faced with that situation, what does one do? ... The hawks would argue, "Well, we've tried dialogue; we've tried blandishments. We've reduced sanctions on pistachios and other things. We've tried to talk to them, and these mullahs keep slapping us in the face. What are we to do?"
Well, I think that you set some clarity for standards of behavior vis-a-vis Iran. I think by not holding the Iranians accountable for taking over [the U.S.] embassy, by not holding them accountable for what happened in Lebanon, only encouraged the radicals. At the same time, we should have had a carrot, opened up some back channel with the mullahs, talk[ed] to them. Once you stop talking to people, you're lost. And I think the American tendency is, as is the Iranians', once this level of hostility arises, [to] stop talking.
The Iranians have desperately wanted a secret channel to the United States for years -- all the Iranians have -- to work out the problem, work out the problems in Jerusalem, work out the problems of oil, work out the problems of Iraq. We've always said, "No, here's our conditions for dialogue: Stop terrorism." ... There used to be three [criteria], I used to remember them.
Well, a big one is weapons of mass destruction and Iran building them. ... That fear has been around. ...
Well, look at the dialogue today, where we're talking about using tactical nuclear weapons against North Korea and the rest. Once this stuff leaks out, the Iranians say, "Well, look, they're going to use nuclear weapons against us. We need missiles."
And how credible is it in your experience that the Iranians are up to building weapons of mass destruction?
I have no idea. ... It's a big issue. They were getting a lot of stuff, but how advanced they are, I really don't know. Whether they're one year away from a nuclear bomb or 20 years away, I have no idea.
But presumably that seems to be one of the biggest issues for people in Washington: "How much time do we have before these guys end up with a weapon? What are we going to do?"
What about Pakistan? What about India? I don't trust either one of them, too. It's a catastrophe if Iran and Iraq get nuclear weapons. [They] will use them against each other one day. ...
I think what we're all talking about is, we all regret the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War, things were predictable, and you could have worked these things out. ...
This is such a slippery subject, terrorism, and if you start painting the whole Islamic world as terrorists, or there's the Russians as supporting terrorism, where does it all end? I don't know. ... There are terrorists, there are mass murderers, but we don't know who they are and who supports them and we don't know how to stop it. ..
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/interviews/baer.html
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Robert Baer was a CIA case officer in the Directorate of Operations from 1976 to 1997, where he served in Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq and Lebanon. He is the author of See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Crown Publishers, 2002). Here, Baer says that there is evidence linking Iran to attacks on American interests, including the Khobar Towers bombing in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed 19 U.S. soldiers in 1996. He says that Iran has been mishandled by U.S. diplomats since the 1980s and that American foreign policy regarding the Islamic Republic is based on myths and misinformation. Baer was interviewed by FRONTLINE producer Neil Docherty on March 22, 2002.
... Maybe you could paint me a political picture of Lebanon in the 1980s, when you first got there. What was happening?
When I first went to Lebanon, it was in December 1982. A seminal event had occurred about six months before I got there, and that was the kidnapping of three Iranian diplomats, the charge d'affaires, and a Lebanese translator. They were murdered and they were buried in a Lebanese forces parking lot -- that's the Christian Lebanese forces -- in a part of Beirut. What we didn't realize as Americans, because we didn't understand Iran, is we were going to get blamed for that kidnapping.
The way it went down is the Iranians assumed, since the Lebanese Christian forces were our allies and the allies of Israel, that we had to be responsible for those kidnappings and the murders later. ... Even though we knew nothing about it -- the CIA didn't know about it, American government didn't know about it, we ourselves were asking what happened to these people -- for the Iranians, it was a key event which for them broke the contract.
So they started kidnapping, and shortly after that they kidnapped David Dodge, the acting president of the American University of Beirut and took him to Tehran. They got caught. We found out about it. We went to the Syrians; the Syrians forced his release. After [Dodge] was released, the Iranians then arranged to use surrogates in order to have plausible denial. ... They used the Hezbollah, a group in Hezbollah, to kidnap hostages.
Why do you think the Iranians were taken and killed?
Maybe it was for robbery. We don't know. We're not sure. ...
How, at that time, are the Iranians looking at the world?
First of all, you've got to look at the 6 June invasion of Lebanon. The Israelis came across the border because of an Abu Nidal assassination attempt in London. For the Iranians, it looked as a pretext for Israel to attack an Islamic country, and they looked at Lebanon as an Islamic country, or a country that should be an Islamic country. So they looked at this as Israeli aggression, but backed by the United States. They simply do not believe that Israel invaded Lebanon without a green light from Washington. I don't know about a green light. Maybe there was, maybe there wasn't. But the point is, the Iranians held us responsible.
... [Then the kidnapping of] these three Iranian diplomats. Not only did they kidnap three Iranian diplomats, but the charge d'affaires ... is very close to [then-President] Rafsanjani. They're almost related. ... He takes it personally. The Iranian government holds the Lebanese forces and the United States responsible.
So you have these two events. And Iran says, "All right, we're at war. Undeclared war, but nonetheless we're at war." Their objective at that point is to drive the Americans out of Lebanon.
The first embassy bombing [in April 1983] I think they were involved in; the Marine [barracks] bombing in October 1983; September 1984, the second embassy bombing. And you know what? The Americans [then] leave. This is a successful policy for them [the bombers]. And what comes in place [after that]? Hezbollah is found in 1985. It's an alternative to the Lebanese government; it's an Islamic party. It mirrors the government in Tehran. ... And then you add on to this that Hezbollah drives Israel out of Lebanon, the first victory against the Israelis ever.
So what we have today, if you want to expand this analysis, [is] Hamas, the Islamic Jihad in Palestine and Gaza carrying out war successfully against Sharon. And the Iranians back in Tehran say, "We're winning. This is the way you fight a war. This is how you defeat F-16s, this is how you defeat aircraft carriers. We beat the United States, we beat the Israelis in Lebanon, and we're going to beat 'em in Palestine."
This is a strong message. I don't care how secular Iran becomes. They still look at the United States, Britain, and France as colonizing powers, and this is the final war ending colonization in the Middle East, using Islam. So for the Iranians, it's very, very logical. We as Americans say, "Well, it's not. We were peacekeepers in Lebanon." They don't look at it that way. Or as Americans, we say, "You can't kidnap innocent people, journalists, priests, people like that. It's wrong." They look at it differently. It's a war of civilizations for them. And it was very successful, frankly, and cheap.
Right. And what about Iranian fingerprints on Hezbollah? What is the evidence that Iran influenced Hezbollah?
Well, we know they influenced Hezbollah because they accept Khomeini and Khamenei as the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, [not Sheik] Fadlallah. Fadlallah is the senior cleric in Lebanon, but he was not the main impetus of Hezbollah. It was Iran. I mean, it's acknowledged; it's public that the religious authority is found in Qom in Iran, and the Iranian clerics. It's a very hierarchical religion.
The fingerprints on Iran in terrorism? There are a few of them. The Marines [bombing of the Marine barracks in October 1983], kidnapping of Charlie Glass, the American journalist, the death of Bill Buckley [the CIA station chief who was kidnapped in March 1984] , the fact that Dodge, the American University of Beirut acting president, was held in Iran in a prison, kidnapped by the Pasdaran [Iran's Revolutionary Guards].
The evidence is there. The fact that Father [Martin] Jenco saw Iranians deliver food to the place he was held in the Bekaa Valley, that was in 1984, I think. The evidence is just there. I mean, it's incontrovertible when you have a hostage seeing the people, you're watching this stuff by satellite, and you've got this intelligence information. And I think the only people that would deny this are people who haven't really followed the issue, or just made up their minds otherwise.
Or Iran itself -- it certainly claims it doesn't [and] won't sponsor terrorism.
The fact is, in 1984 and 1985, they were in control of the Sheik Abdullah Barracks in Baalbek. I saw with my own eyes, journalists saw with their own eyes, that the Pasdaran was guarding the places where the hostages were held. When [Jerry] Levin escaped, he escaped out of one of the buildings at the Sheik Abdullah barracks. They saw the Iranians deliver the food. It's just denying reality. The Iranians can't say, "We didn't know anything about it." It's crazy.
Fast-forwarding to today, what's your impression or your knowledge about their support for Islamic Jihad?
Early in the 1990s, they supported it. They provided training, weapons in the Bekaa Valley, supported morally. They've stated publicly they support these guys, the Qods force, which is part of the Pasdaran.
What they're doing today, I don't know. The Israelis claim that an agreement was made between Arafat and the Pasdaran in Moscow six months ago. I don't know. ... I don't trust the Israelis. They're in the middle of this fight. I no longer do intelligence. I have no way to measure the facts from propaganda. I think the Israelis would know. But are they going to tell us the truth? Who knows?
What about Buckley? Can you expand a little on what happened -- why he was taken, and what happened to him?
Buckley, the Iranians knew who he was. When he would go to the airport at Beirut International Airport and send visitors to the United States with intelligence connections, it was very clear. He lived in one apartment, always wore a suit, always meticulously dressed, always left at the same time. For the Iranians or their surrogates, the token surrogates who took him, he was a very attractive target.
You could get the ambassador; it would be great for the Iranians, but he was too hard to get. He had protection and an armored car. Buckley didn't. He was held for a while in Beirut and taken to the Sheik Abdullah Barracks where he was held. The winter of, I believe it was 1984-1985, he caught pneumonia. He'd been really roughed up, beaten up, tortured during interrogation. Combination of pneumonia and torture; his whole system collapsed, and he died in captivity.
Doesn't do much for Iran-American relations, does it?
No. Well, I mean, the Iranians have their case of the shah, the overthrow of [nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad] Mossadeq, the corruption of American companies and bribing people in Iran, our feting the shah, overlooking human rights violations. It was during the Cold War. And the Iranians say, "Well, so what if it was during the Cold War? You supported the dictator, you kept him in power." Washington's argument's going to be, "Well, we didn't keep him power. He was the Shah of Iran. He was there before we ever got involved. Iranians kept him in power because they tolerated his behavior."
There are cases for both sides. I have my own feelings, you know. I just don't think that you should attack innocents, like the World Trade Center. It's not the Western way. But my opinions are irrelevant in this. We have to look at it from the Iranian standpoint, why they did [the things they did] ... and what they want. ...
In the Middle East, it's about a people, the Arabs and the Iranians, who feel humiliated from the 19th century. It's got nothing to do with the United States. But all of a sudden in 1948, the United States inherited all these colonial problems. It inherited the Gulf from Britain in 1970. But we weren't capable of managing an empire in the Middle East. It's just not the American way. So we tweaked something here, send money, send troops.
And now we're dealing it militarily, which you can't solve this problem [militarily]. ... Afghanistan's been a failure so far. ... [W]e are gradually moving into a war unconsciously against Islam -- which you don't want to do. There's just too many people, there's too many countries. They own the oil, most of the world's oil resources, and hope we sidestep this.
But it's not because of the ill will of the White House, the State Department, or the CIA. It's a basic misunderstanding of what's happening in the Middle East, and it doesn't have to do with Democrats or Republicans. And one side is support for Israel -- that's the way [others] perceive it. ...
And how important is Israel in American foreign policy?
It's extremely important. But it's because we look at Israel as a democracy, one. ... And the Holocaust is very important in the American conscience, political conscience. It's a gut reaction. We support Israel for those two reasons, the Holocaust and democracy.
And Americans say, "Why can't the Arabs see this?" The Arabs, on the other hand, are saying, "We're not responsible for the Holocaust. We protected the Jews during the Second World War. They fled there. We didn't bother them. They are the ones that set up a country."
And then the more radicalized [the] Muslims become, the more they look at [Israel] as a colonial appendage of the United States that is meant to oppress them. The terms of their dialogue are being degraded by the day, too. And so [you get] these people that ran the airplanes into the World Trade Center, saying, "The West is hostile to us, and we've got to fight it."
But at the moment, we're talking war on terror.
Well, that's a mistake, because yes, it is war on terror. But we are going to need the Muslims to fight this war on terror. We need Saudi Arabia; we need to make Saudi Arabia feel comfortable. We need Saudi Arabia to go back to its schools and reform them and stop preaching jihad. We need Saudi Arabia to join the 21st century, give jobs to these people equally, and cut back on the corruption ... start giving these people in the south, Asir province, where the suicide bombers came from, a stake in life. But we can't do it with bombs. ...
And how important [is] Hezbollah? ...
It's extremely important. Hezbollah's divided into many parties. There's the Islamic Resistance in the south, which beat the Israelis. They attacked the Israeli army. They defeated the Israeli army on Lebanese soil. I do not know how we can describe that other than a national liberation movement.
I don't agree that Hezbollah itself is a terrorist organization. It delivers powdered milk; it takes care of people. It's a social organization; it's a political organization. It fights corruption.
Then there's the Islamic Resistance, which is an army, which is a guerrilla force, fighting for control of its own country. And then, under the Hezbollah umbrella, was the Islamic Jihad, which I call their special security, which was controlled by Iran, which carried out terrorism against the West. And you can paint Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. You can do that for political reasons, but strictly speaking, it is many things. Just as [with] the IRA, you got Sinn Fein and you've got the real IRA, which is conducting terrorism.
And is the distinction important?
It's very important.
Why?
Well, I mean if you're going to retaliate against terrorism -- what we call terrorism, [which is] the attacking of innocent people for political motives, not liberating your own country -- we have to distinguish the two groups. Fadlallah is not a terrorist. ... He was a spiritual leader in his organization. ... We can't label him a terrorist and fight Hezbollah as an organization in its entirety. We have to isolate the murderers and fight them.
But when [Hezbollah] was taking American hostages...
It wasn't Hezbollah; it was the Islamic Jihad organization which was taking [hostages]. It was a very distinct organization, which was separate from Hezbollah because you had the consultative council which only had a vague idea of what the hostage-takers were doing. The hostage-takers were taking orders from Iran. Hezbollah itself does not care about American citizens running around Lebanon, as it doesn't care today. I mean, as an ex-CIA officer, I can go see Hezbollah, I can talk to them. They don't care. ...
But explain that there is actually a different management structure here [that] we're talking [about]?
Absolutely. And it's very clear that special security in Hezbollah took its orders for all the important years from the IRGC, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [in Iran]. Hezbollah itself accepted money and spiritual leadership from Iran, but it had nothing to do with terrorism. Ninety-nine percent of Hezbollah, people in Hezbollah, know nothing about it. They don't have the slightest idea how it works, who's behind it -- the Iranian role. And that nuance, I think, is missed in Washington today.
I think it's a mistake in U.S. foreign policy, first of all, to paint Islam as an enemy, because you get dragged into a cultural war which we can't win. You have to isolate the people who really do sponsor mass murder or kidnappings or individual murders of people, that are killing Americans in Kuwait today, that flew the airplanes in. Those are isolated individuals which don't have anything to do with Islam in general. Same way in Hezbollah. It's a small group of people kidnapping, murdering. But Hezbollah itself is not a terrorist organization.
And what about Iran? In that context, how worried should we be about Iran?
Well, if you drive Iran into the corner, Iran has the means to retaliate all it wants. ... Iran -- if it feels it's backed into the corner, it's at war again with the United States -- will resort to terrorism, because the people who were involved are still in Iran. They're free. They don't agree with the policies, [with] the way Iran's going now. They think there should be more attacks against Americans. Where they're going to be depends on how we treat them.
In that context, how did you respond to the State of the Union address and the "axis of evil" speech?
Well, that's American politics. I think the United States has no intention of attacking Iran or provoking Iran. ...
But was it a wise selection of words?
I think Iran has been mishandled by the United States since the 1980s, since 1979. We should have determined responsibility for taking over that embassy. It was an act of war, and we should have responded accordingly. By not responding to taking over that embassy in a graduated fashion, by that dumb hostage rescue thing, by not responding to that, we only encouraged people who advocated terrorism in Iran. And it wasn't the whole country that did [advocated terrorism].
We should have dealt with that, nation to nation, state to state. They violated sovereign law of the United States. So it's a series of mistakes. But now, to paint Iran as this evil country, we don't know what's going to happen, because we don't know what's happening in Iran. Will this encourage the moderates to change Iranian policy? I don't know. ...
Do you feel America doesn't know Iran?
No, it doesn't know anything about it. Doesn't know anything about it. I have seen no dialogue in this country, in the press, or in academia to suggest to me that we really know what's going on in Iran. We are dealing with myths, misinformation, a press that has no idea. It boils down to women's rights or wishful thinking about Khatami or misperceptions.
As a professional intelligence person, how would you rate American intelligence in Iran?
It's lousy ... because we don't have any people in Iran. You really need people on the ground in a country to give you ground truth. You complement that with other intelligence from other countries, from technical intelligence, and you can get a good picture. But once you don't have people on the ground, you really lose track of what's happening in a country.
I mean, North Korea has always been a black hole for us, because we don't have people there. We don't have people talking to the North Koreans. You have to hear people complain about the price of milk, you have to hear people. How do they view the United States? It's very important to get a feel for a country. I mean, I lost track of the United States because I was gone for so many years, and I'm an American. ...
Tell me about [Imad Mughniyah] and his importance.
He's very important but there's certain myths about him -- that he's running the whole thing, he's the master. There are no master terrorists. They're just a whole group of people. He's very effective, very efficient. He runs commando-style operations. He's got incredible security. He can tap people, go where he wants, change IDs. He was involved in many kidnappings. I'm not sure he was involved in the first embassy bombing; he probably was, but I know that from inference. It's very hard to pin these people down, because it takes patience. But anyhow, Mughniyah is very important. He's an important player, is involved in all sorts of terrorism operations.
What's his relationship to Iran?
He was paid by Iran. He had direct connection with a couple of Iranians. ... He was recruited in the Islamic Jihad movement in 1982-1983, like that, and agreed to carry out operations against United States. He's a believer, undoubtedly. But most of all, he's very effective. He can compartment[alize] operations, he's got people that are loyal. He's ruthless and he's ready to lose people. He's ready for himself to die, too, which makes him a formidable opponent. ...
Mughniyah is a professional terrorist. I've never heard an explanation [of] what really makes the guy tick. But it was very clear to us in the 1980s that he took his orders directly from [Iran's] Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. ... He was paid by them, he took orders, he put out communiqués. Occasionally he would do things on his own, when he'd get angry about something. He was an independent player. He was probably a nightmare to run for the Iranians, but he carried out their orders. And I don't think there's anybody in the American intelligence community [who] would disagree with that. ...
What do you do with Iran when you're posturing against Iraq, when it's likely you may be taking some action against Iraq? If you're a CIA intelligence expert in the region, you must be getting a little worried about how we handle all this.
... What you have to do is put yourself in the position of the Iranians. ... An invasion of Iraq is going to cause resentment in the Islamic world, which is going to help the radicals in Tehran, who are going to say, "Listen, we told you all along. It's the United States against Islam. Stop this reformist stuff and let's liberate Jerusalem." ...
What about the Iran-Iraq war and America's position on that? How important is that?
It's very important. Iraq was under threat. The Reagan administration knew that if Iraq was overrun by Iran, there'd be total chaos in the Gulf. We provided help to Iraq during the war -- material help and information help -- which was extremely helpful to the Iraqis. The problem is, it built up resentment in Iran because the radicals said, "Look, they've always been against us. We've got to stop this." ...
What are the current links, do you think, between Iran and terrorism? How would you characterize or summarize it currently?
... Last thing I saw before I left the CIA was this intention to set up a relationship with bin Laden. There was a meeting which occurred in July 1996 in Afghanistan, where the Iranians went in to propose a strategic comprehensive alliance against the United States. And what that involved, whether it came to fruition or not, I don't know. In 1996, that was their intention. And that after that, anything I have to say is pure speculation. ...
Iran and the Taliban were not friends, right?
In the Middle East, my enemy's enemy is my friend. Just don't ever forget that rule. ...
[But] other than what you've said, we haven't really heard of any direct links with Al Qaeda. I guess the last one was they were letting some [Al Qaeda fugitives] escape into Iran. But we're not suggesting that Iran's fingerprints were on Sept. 11.
No. How would we ever know, though? Again, put yourself in the position of the Iranians, or an Iranian. Maybe not Iran as a state, maybe it's an individual Iranian that's carrying on this war. Would you convey these by telephone, by Internet, a decision to participate in Sept. 11? It's done orally, face to face, probably outside, so there's no room audio.
So we'll never know. It's just one of those questions we'll never know because the people involved will never talk. They don't keep a record of it. They don't need to submit receipts on their tax forms at the end of the year. We'll just never know. ...
And take me back to Khobar Towers. What do we know about Khobar Towers and Iran?
We know Iran was involved. We know Iran trained, gave alias passports, helped provide surveillance of American facilities in Saudi Arabia, and that Khomeini gave a fatwa to blow up Khobar. This has been acknowledged in the indictment, it's been acknowledged by Louis Freeh in The New Yorker.
Saudi Arabia didn't want to look too closely into it, because at that point, there was a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and they certainly didn't want to indict Iran. It was another terrorism attack that was passed over. It was overlooked because we didn't want to do anything against Iran.
Iran is the third rail of American foreign policy in the world. Brought down Jimmy Carter, Iranian crisis, and almost brought down Reagan, almost, close, with Iran-Contra. So every president since then says, "Iran is bad, but we're not going to do anything about it. It's a sleeping dog, don't wake it up."
And along comes the latest president, George W. [Bush], and he strongly intimates we are going to do something about it, this evil empire.
What can we do about it? We can only cope with these problems inasmuch as we solve the problem of Israel and Palestine. If we can implement U.N. Resolution 242, we can internationalize Jerusalem, do something about the right of return of Palestinians to Palestine. And then go to the Middle East and say, "All right, now it's time to implement other U.N. resolutions." ... But it really does boil down to Israel, in a lot of ways. ...
And when you were in the CIA, was there an awareness of this? ...
No, but it's not CIA's business. These are the politics we saw, but we were never involved in this. We never had to worry about resolutions, U.N. 242. I mean, [we] read about it and cared about it. And I know when it was passed and I know this dialogue's always been going on between Syria and United States, Lebanon.
Our objective was to find out who was taking hostages in Lebanon, who blew up our embassy, who blew up the Marines -- and predict future attacks. At the same time, we were listening to our agents, people on the ground. That's how we spent our entire life.
... When we began, you mentioned the misunderstanding about the Iranians being killed in Lebanon. ... It struck me when you were saying that, that the relationship between America and Iran seems to be one completely fostered on misunderstandings of this sort. ...
... Yes, the misunderstandings go back to Mossadeq. [Editor's note: Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, who wanted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and limit foreign involvement in Iran's internal affairs, was removed from office in a CIA-supported coup in 1953, which allowed the shah -- who was friendly to Western powers -- to return to Tehran. See the timeline for more background on Iran's history.]
The Iranians are generally, as people, pro-American. A lot of Iranians live here. The Iranian music industry is based in Los Angeles. There's a lot of travel back and forth. The Iranians have been normally in history pro-Israel as a balance to the Arabs.
But along came Mossadeq. And then you had the corruption in Tehran, all the American companies, this supplying of arms to Iran to fight the Cold War, all the military bases. The Iranians looked at this as if we were participating in the corruption of their society, American companies and American government. And then you had the revolution and then you had the Mujahedeen-e Khalq, which split off from the revolution, and a lot of them set up in the United States.
Then you had the Iran-Iraq war, and then our continued support to Israel. And the Iranians look at us as a hostile country, just as we look at the Soviet Union as a hostile country. ... There was a lot of misperceptions. And there's no dialogue.
So faced with that situation, what does one do? ... The hawks would argue, "Well, we've tried dialogue; we've tried blandishments. We've reduced sanctions on pistachios and other things. We've tried to talk to them, and these mullahs keep slapping us in the face. What are we to do?"
Well, I think that you set some clarity for standards of behavior vis-a-vis Iran. I think by not holding the Iranians accountable for taking over [the U.S.] embassy, by not holding them accountable for what happened in Lebanon, only encouraged the radicals. At the same time, we should have had a carrot, opened up some back channel with the mullahs, talk[ed] to them. Once you stop talking to people, you're lost. And I think the American tendency is, as is the Iranians', once this level of hostility arises, [to] stop talking.
The Iranians have desperately wanted a secret channel to the United States for years -- all the Iranians have -- to work out the problem, work out the problems in Jerusalem, work out the problems of oil, work out the problems of Iraq. We've always said, "No, here's our conditions for dialogue: Stop terrorism." ... There used to be three [criteria], I used to remember them.
Well, a big one is weapons of mass destruction and Iran building them. ... That fear has been around. ...
Well, look at the dialogue today, where we're talking about using tactical nuclear weapons against North Korea and the rest. Once this stuff leaks out, the Iranians say, "Well, look, they're going to use nuclear weapons against us. We need missiles."
And how credible is it in your experience that the Iranians are up to building weapons of mass destruction?
I have no idea. ... It's a big issue. They were getting a lot of stuff, but how advanced they are, I really don't know. Whether they're one year away from a nuclear bomb or 20 years away, I have no idea.
But presumably that seems to be one of the biggest issues for people in Washington: "How much time do we have before these guys end up with a weapon? What are we going to do?"
What about Pakistan? What about India? I don't trust either one of them, too. It's a catastrophe if Iran and Iraq get nuclear weapons. [They] will use them against each other one day. ...
I think what we're all talking about is, we all regret the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War, things were predictable, and you could have worked these things out. ...
This is such a slippery subject, terrorism, and if you start painting the whole Islamic world as terrorists, or there's the Russians as supporting terrorism, where does it all end? I don't know. ... There are terrorists, there are mass murderers, but we don't know who they are and who supports them and we don't know how to stop it. ..
jueves, 29 de enero de 2015
"Iran Helped Crush Syria's Revolution"
Reposting this article as it echoes much of what Mani Vehumen told us here:http://freedomforeastkurdistan.blogspot.com/2014/06/the-east-kurdistan-independent-party.html about Iran's involvement in training and arming Jihadists and sending them into Syria.
Some more analysis can be found here:
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
Iran Helped Crush Syria's Revolution -
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com
Posted 2014-11-12 19:48 GMT
When protests started in Syria in 2011, Iran came to the aid of Bashar al-Assad's government.
It didn't trust the armed forces so it helped create paramilitary groups to break up the protests and then battle the emerging rebel movement.
As the war intensified Iran brought in militias from Iraq, took over military strategy, and sent in not only its own advisers and fighters, but also those from Lebanon's Hezbollah.
Iran is following almost the exact same script in Iraq today to counter the insurgency after it launched its summer offensive in 2014.
Two Countries, One Very Similar Strategy
In both Syria and Iraq the Iranians came to rely upon irregular forces because they did not trust the army and police. When Syrians began demonstrating against the Assad government in 2011 there was a general feeling in Damascus and Tehran that the military could not be trusted to put them down.
That was proven true when many soldiers would later desert and join the rebels. In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) disintegrated in the face of the insurgency when its summer offensive began in June 2014.
Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy estimated that 60 of the Army's 243 battalions were lost with all of their equipment in northern Iraq after the fall of Mosul. A US official told the New York Times that five of Iraq's 14 army divisions were combat ineffective.
With neither the Syrian nor Iraqi armed forces proving reliable Iran turned to militias to fill the void.
In Syria, Iran relied upon Syrian and Iraqi militias to handle security, while the latter were brought back to Iraq when the insurgency took off there in 2014. The Assad government created the Shabiha, then the Popular Committees, which would later become the National Defense Force (NDF) to deal with the protests and then the rebels.
Iran advised Syria on the creation of all three forces using the example of its own Basij. The Basij were a paramilitary group created in Iran during the 1979 revolution and were used to put down the Green Movement in 2009. Iran provided training to all three forces not only in Syria, but in Iran as well.
When the fighting really took off in Syria Tehran also brought in its militia allies from Iraq. This included the League of the Righteous, Hezbollah Brigades, the Badr Organization, and new groups like Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas, and many others. Eventually a Badr commander was appointed by Iran to coordinate all the Iraqi militias with the Syrian and Iranian governments.
This was no surprise as Badr was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and had the longest relationship with Tehran of any of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
A similar policy was carried out in Iraq. Those same militias that were fighting in Syria began mobilizing for deployment within Iraq in January 2014 after Fallujah fell in Anbar. That included creating new popular defense brigades and launching recruitment campaigns. Many groups also brought back their fighters from Syria to face the Iraqi insurgency, and eventually became integrated into regular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units.
This would only increase after June's ISIS blitz. As in Syria, Badr has seemingly taken control of militias and larger security policy in Iraq. Badr head Hadi Ameri has led operations in Salahaddin's Amerli, Babil's Jurf al-Sakhr and is currently in command of re-taking the Baiji district in northern Salahaddin. Mohammed Ghaban from Badr was also recently named the new Interior Minister.
This served several purposes. First, the militias proved capable fighters against the Syrian rebels and Iraqi insurgency.
Second, it allowed Iran to increase its influence in both countries by not only asserting its militia allies as major defenders of the government, but also becoming part of the existing military structures in Syria and Iraq. Institutionalizing the militias is a way to guarantee their longevity in both countries long after the rebellions are put down.
Iran's Hand In Syria
Iran came to define much of the military strategy in both Syria and Iraq. As soon as the protests started in Syria, Iran began sending in advisers to help the Assad government. This was directed by the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) General Qasim Suleimani, and assisted by IRGC-QF head of operations and training General Mohsen Chizari.
Both were named by the US Treasury Department in May 2011 for their role in suppressing the Syrian public. A retired IRGC general said that there were 60-70 Quds Force commanders in Syria at any given time.
There were also several thousand Iranian Basij militiamen deployed to the country. These men not only advised the Shabiha, the National Defense Force, and the Syrian military, but carried out combat operations as well.
Similarly in Iraq, in June Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran was ready to defend Iraq after the fall of Mosul. Immediately afterward there were reports that 150-2,000 Quds Force members were dispatched to Iraq.
That force is said to be several thousand strong now. They are deployed not only to central Iraq, but are also with Kurdish forces in Diyala and Ninewa.
The Hand Of Iran's Strategic Mastermind
Just like in Syria, General Qassem Suleimani has been put in charge of Iraq. He's said to have set up a control center at the Rasheed Air Base in Baghdad, helped with the defense of Samara in June and Irbil in August, the relief of Amerli in September, the clearing of Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil in October, and the current operation in Baiji, Salahaddin.
This has all been highlighted in various postings to social media with pictures of the general throughout Iraq. This is part of an on-going propaganda campaign to let Iraqis and the international community know that Iran is on the ground and leading the fight in Iraq.
Iran is not only providing assistance at the front to the ground troops in Syria and Iraq, but is playing a large role in the formation of policy in Damascus and Baghdad. This is again increasing Iran's influence not only with the respective governments, but at the street level as well as it is seen as the main defenders of both countries.
Hezbollah Enters The Fight On Iran's Behalf
To assist with its operations Iran brought in Lebanon's Hezbollah to both Syria and Iraq. Hezbollah provided another set of trainers for the Syrian military and militias. Lebanese fighters have also taken part in combat in Syria since 2012.
After the fall of Mosul, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah offered to send fighters to Iraq. By July the Christian Science Monitor reported that there were around 250 Hezbollah advisers in the country.
That month a Hezbollah commander died near Mosul as well showing that they were at the front. Hezbollah advisers were also said to have been involved in the recent operation in Jurf al-Sakhr that successfully cleared the area in the middle of October.
Iran has often relied upon Hezbollah as a proxy force to assist with its foreign policy. In Arab countries like Syria and Iraq it's believed that they provide better trainers as they share the same language and culture. In Syria they have also provided snipers, intelligence gathering, etc. They may do the same in Iraq as well if they are not already.
Iran has closely followed the same military policy in both Syria and Iraq.
As the security forces of Damascus and Baghdad were questionable, Iran turned to militias to fight protesters, rebels and insurgents. Iranian advisers and fighters, and Lebanon's Hezbollah supported these irregular forces.
Iran's Endgame
Tehran's ultimate goals in both countries are generally the same with one exception.
In both nations it wants to defeat the insurgents. It also wants to expand its influence, which it has greatly done. It not only has advisers throughout the security forces and in government offices, but it is shaping strategy and both Syria and Iraq have come to rely upon Iranian-funded militias for their defense.
Tehran is being opportunistic as well in thinking long-term here. It is taking advantage of the situations as they presented themselves in each country to assert themselves within the state. It also hoping that this power remains far after the insurgencies in both countries are put down.
Finally in Iraq it has one additional concern, which is to make sure that the country never emerges as a rival again as it was during the Saddam period. The Iran-Iraq War still looms large over Iran's worldview, so even though it wants Iraq to win its current war, it does not want it to emerge as a strong nation afterward.
That is the real story of Iran's relationship with Iraq. While Iran has become one of Iraq's most important allies in its time of need, it has its own agenda, which does not always suit Iraq's interests.
Some more analysis can be found here:
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria
Iran Helped Crush Syria's Revolution -
http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com
Posted 2014-11-12 19:48 GMT
When protests started in Syria in 2011, Iran came to the aid of Bashar al-Assad's government.
It didn't trust the armed forces so it helped create paramilitary groups to break up the protests and then battle the emerging rebel movement.
As the war intensified Iran brought in militias from Iraq, took over military strategy, and sent in not only its own advisers and fighters, but also those from Lebanon's Hezbollah.
Iran is following almost the exact same script in Iraq today to counter the insurgency after it launched its summer offensive in 2014.
Two Countries, One Very Similar Strategy
In both Syria and Iraq the Iranians came to rely upon irregular forces because they did not trust the army and police. When Syrians began demonstrating against the Assad government in 2011 there was a general feeling in Damascus and Tehran that the military could not be trusted to put them down.
That was proven true when many soldiers would later desert and join the rebels. In Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) disintegrated in the face of the insurgency when its summer offensive began in June 2014.
Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy estimated that 60 of the Army's 243 battalions were lost with all of their equipment in northern Iraq after the fall of Mosul. A US official told the New York Times that five of Iraq's 14 army divisions were combat ineffective.
With neither the Syrian nor Iraqi armed forces proving reliable Iran turned to militias to fill the void.
In Syria, Iran relied upon Syrian and Iraqi militias to handle security, while the latter were brought back to Iraq when the insurgency took off there in 2014. The Assad government created the Shabiha, then the Popular Committees, which would later become the National Defense Force (NDF) to deal with the protests and then the rebels.
Iran advised Syria on the creation of all three forces using the example of its own Basij. The Basij were a paramilitary group created in Iran during the 1979 revolution and were used to put down the Green Movement in 2009. Iran provided training to all three forces not only in Syria, but in Iran as well.
When the fighting really took off in Syria Tehran also brought in its militia allies from Iraq. This included the League of the Righteous, Hezbollah Brigades, the Badr Organization, and new groups like Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas, and many others. Eventually a Badr commander was appointed by Iran to coordinate all the Iraqi militias with the Syrian and Iranian governments.
This was no surprise as Badr was created by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and had the longest relationship with Tehran of any of the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.
A similar policy was carried out in Iraq. Those same militias that were fighting in Syria began mobilizing for deployment within Iraq in January 2014 after Fallujah fell in Anbar. That included creating new popular defense brigades and launching recruitment campaigns. Many groups also brought back their fighters from Syria to face the Iraqi insurgency, and eventually became integrated into regular Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) units.
This would only increase after June's ISIS blitz. As in Syria, Badr has seemingly taken control of militias and larger security policy in Iraq. Badr head Hadi Ameri has led operations in Salahaddin's Amerli, Babil's Jurf al-Sakhr and is currently in command of re-taking the Baiji district in northern Salahaddin. Mohammed Ghaban from Badr was also recently named the new Interior Minister.
This served several purposes. First, the militias proved capable fighters against the Syrian rebels and Iraqi insurgency.
Second, it allowed Iran to increase its influence in both countries by not only asserting its militia allies as major defenders of the government, but also becoming part of the existing military structures in Syria and Iraq. Institutionalizing the militias is a way to guarantee their longevity in both countries long after the rebellions are put down.
Iran's Hand In Syria
Iran came to define much of the military strategy in both Syria and Iraq. As soon as the protests started in Syria, Iran began sending in advisers to help the Assad government. This was directed by the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) General Qasim Suleimani, and assisted by IRGC-QF head of operations and training General Mohsen Chizari.
Both were named by the US Treasury Department in May 2011 for their role in suppressing the Syrian public. A retired IRGC general said that there were 60-70 Quds Force commanders in Syria at any given time.
There were also several thousand Iranian Basij militiamen deployed to the country. These men not only advised the Shabiha, the National Defense Force, and the Syrian military, but carried out combat operations as well.
Similarly in Iraq, in June Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that Iran was ready to defend Iraq after the fall of Mosul. Immediately afterward there were reports that 150-2,000 Quds Force members were dispatched to Iraq.
That force is said to be several thousand strong now. They are deployed not only to central Iraq, but are also with Kurdish forces in Diyala and Ninewa.
The Hand Of Iran's Strategic Mastermind
Just like in Syria, General Qassem Suleimani has been put in charge of Iraq. He's said to have set up a control center at the Rasheed Air Base in Baghdad, helped with the defense of Samara in June and Irbil in August, the relief of Amerli in September, the clearing of Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil in October, and the current operation in Baiji, Salahaddin.
This has all been highlighted in various postings to social media with pictures of the general throughout Iraq. This is part of an on-going propaganda campaign to let Iraqis and the international community know that Iran is on the ground and leading the fight in Iraq.
Iran is not only providing assistance at the front to the ground troops in Syria and Iraq, but is playing a large role in the formation of policy in Damascus and Baghdad. This is again increasing Iran's influence not only with the respective governments, but at the street level as well as it is seen as the main defenders of both countries.
Hezbollah Enters The Fight On Iran's Behalf
To assist with its operations Iran brought in Lebanon's Hezbollah to both Syria and Iraq. Hezbollah provided another set of trainers for the Syrian military and militias. Lebanese fighters have also taken part in combat in Syria since 2012.
After the fall of Mosul, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah offered to send fighters to Iraq. By July the Christian Science Monitor reported that there were around 250 Hezbollah advisers in the country.
That month a Hezbollah commander died near Mosul as well showing that they were at the front. Hezbollah advisers were also said to have been involved in the recent operation in Jurf al-Sakhr that successfully cleared the area in the middle of October.
Iran has often relied upon Hezbollah as a proxy force to assist with its foreign policy. In Arab countries like Syria and Iraq it's believed that they provide better trainers as they share the same language and culture. In Syria they have also provided snipers, intelligence gathering, etc. They may do the same in Iraq as well if they are not already.
Iran has closely followed the same military policy in both Syria and Iraq.
As the security forces of Damascus and Baghdad were questionable, Iran turned to militias to fight protesters, rebels and insurgents. Iranian advisers and fighters, and Lebanon's Hezbollah supported these irregular forces.
Iran's Endgame
Tehran's ultimate goals in both countries are generally the same with one exception.
In both nations it wants to defeat the insurgents. It also wants to expand its influence, which it has greatly done. It not only has advisers throughout the security forces and in government offices, but it is shaping strategy and both Syria and Iraq have come to rely upon Iranian-funded militias for their defense.
Tehran is being opportunistic as well in thinking long-term here. It is taking advantage of the situations as they presented themselves in each country to assert themselves within the state. It also hoping that this power remains far after the insurgencies in both countries are put down.
Finally in Iraq it has one additional concern, which is to make sure that the country never emerges as a rival again as it was during the Saddam period. The Iran-Iraq War still looms large over Iran's worldview, so even though it wants Iraq to win its current war, it does not want it to emerge as a strong nation afterward.
That is the real story of Iran's relationship with Iraq. While Iran has become one of Iraq's most important allies in its time of need, it has its own agenda, which does not always suit Iraq's interests.
Assyrian Priest Arrested in Tehran
Assyrian Pastor arrested following house raid in Tehran
http://barnabasfund.org/news/Assyrian-Pastor-arrested-following-house-raid-in-Tehran
IRAN
15/01/2015 14:14:46
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Interrupting a Christmas celebration, security officers from the Revolutionary Court raided the home of Pastor Victor Bet-Tamarz on 26 December in Tehran, Iran, and temporarily arrested everyone in attendance. Pastor Victor and one other man remain under arrest, although there is no further information as to their situation.
Each of the Christians present were filmed and told to identify themselves to the camera, stating why they were there and why they thought they were being arrested. Separating the men from the women, the agents proceeded to search each person present, confiscating Bibles, mobile phones and identification papers. Pastor Victor’s home was also searched and his computer, mobile phones and books were seized.
Victor Bet-Tamarz is an Assyrian Pastor who was formerly officially recognised by the Iranian government. As an ancient community of modern-day Iran, Assyrian Christians have been officially permitted to worship in their own language, which is a form of Aramaic. However, Pastor Victor’s church in Tehran has remained closed since 2009 after he refused to comply with regulations that demanded Assyrian church leaders ban non-Assyrians from attending and stop services in Farsi, the language of the Muslim majority.
As an officially recognised minority group in Iran, Assyrians are granted one parliamentary seat, currently occupied by Yonatan Betkolia, who estimates that today there are as few as 20,000 Assyrians in Iran.
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/01/18/iran-has-held-an-assyrian-pastor-in-prison-since-raiding-his-home-on-christmas-day/
ASSYRIAN PASTOR IN PRISON SINCE RAIDING HIS HOME ON CHRISTMAS DAY
AFP PHOTO/ATTA KENARE
by ADELLE NAZARIAN
18 Jan 2015
7
The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Revolutionary Court interrupted Christmas when officers raided the home of an Assyrian pastor in Tehran and arrested everyone in attendance. Pastor Victor Bet-Tamarz and another man remain under arrest; the others were reportedly freed.
All of the Christians present were videotaped by the officers and asked to state their full names and explain why they thought they were being arrested, according to the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA). After separating the men from women (mixing between genders is strictly prohibited under Sharia Law), the guards reportedly proceeded to search all those present, confiscating Bibles, mobile phones, and identification papers. Pastor Victor’s residence was also searched, and his computer, mobile phones, and books were seized.
Assyrian Christians have been officially permitted to worship in their own language, which is a form of Aramaic; Aramaic is the language used in the Zohar which is the literary work associated with Jewish mysticism known as the Kabbalah. Pastor Victor had previously been formally recognized by the Iranian government; however, his church in Tehran was closed in 2009 because he had refused to comply with Iranian law, which calls for the banning of non-Assyrians from attending Assyrian churches, AINA notes. The Islamic Republic of Iran also demanded that Pastor Victor’s services only be taught in Assyrian and not in Farsi, which is the official language of the Muslim majority.
There are less than 20,000 Assyrians left in Iran today, and as an officially recognized minority group, they are granted one parliamentary seat–which is currently occupied by Yonatan Betkolia.
Iran’s Basij or “morality police” also apprehended nine other Christians on Christmas Day without giving any reason for the arrests. The Basij (in Farsi the full name is Sazmane Basij-e Mostaz’afin which literally translates to “The Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed”) is primarily comprised of volunteers. In addition to the Christmas arrests, the Islamic Republic carried out the executions of nine people in Iran’s infamous Adelabad prison, where gross violations of human rights are also carried out–including routine beatings, harassment, and sodomy as a form of torture. In Farsi, “Adel” means one who exhibits “justice,” has morals, and is righteous.
Ironically, the day of the multiple arrests and executions, Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei sent out the following Christmas Eve and Christmas Day tweets in which he sang words of love and admiration for Jesus Christ and called on people to “truly honor Jesus’s birthday”:
#Jesus like all prophets was herald of monotheism& human dignity; nowadays humanity needs this message more than ever.#Ferguson #Gaza 1/1/93
— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) December 24, 2014
If #Jesus were among us today he wouldn’t spare a second to fight the arrogants&support the oppressed.#Ferguson #Gaza pic.twitter.com/P0N8jmKyQU
— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) December 24, 2014
It’s time for all caring Muslims, Christians & Jews to obey the prophets & truly honor #Jesus‘ birthday by standing up agnst Israeli crimes.
— Khamenei.ir (@khamenei_ir) December 24, 2014
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the largest state-sponsor of terrorism in the world.
Follow Adelle Nazarian on Twitter: @AdelleNaz.
East Kurdish Family Fighting Together Against ISIS
http://basnews.com/en/news/2015/01/28/kurdish-family-fighting-together-on-the-frontlines/
Kurdish Family Fighting Together on the Frontlines
Father, mother and daughter fighting against Islamic State
Basnews | Hoshmand Sadiq views
28.01.2015 18:14
ERBIL
An Iranian Kurdish family is fighting together against Islamic State militants near the Mosul frontlines in northern Iraq.
Bestun Kalhori, originally from Kermanshah, a Kurdish city in the west of Iran, is a Peshmerga of the Iranian Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). He is fighting alongside his wife and daughter.
“With the IS militants’ attacks on the Kurdistan Region, I bought my wife and daughter to fight together,” said Kalhori proudly.
“With our Peshmerga brothers and sisters, my family is fighting the Jihadi group near Mosul,” added Bestun.
Bestun says he has been Peshmerga for the last 22 years. He, his wife and his 18 year-old daughter won’t be leaving the frontline until they defeat IS militants in the area.
Kalhori he left Iran because of his oppostion to the regime in Tehran, and has lived in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital Erbil for more than a decade. By taking up arms, he is showing his love for Kurdistan, he says.
A number of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties have participated with the Peshmerga in fighting IS militants since their attacks on Kurdistan region began last June.
Kurdish Family Fighting Together on the Frontlines
Father, mother and daughter fighting against Islamic State
Basnews | Hoshmand Sadiq views
28.01.2015 18:14
ERBIL
An Iranian Kurdish family is fighting together against Islamic State militants near the Mosul frontlines in northern Iraq.
Bestun Kalhori, originally from Kermanshah, a Kurdish city in the west of Iran, is a Peshmerga of the Iranian Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK). He is fighting alongside his wife and daughter.
“With the IS militants’ attacks on the Kurdistan Region, I bought my wife and daughter to fight together,” said Kalhori proudly.
“With our Peshmerga brothers and sisters, my family is fighting the Jihadi group near Mosul,” added Bestun.
Bestun says he has been Peshmerga for the last 22 years. He, his wife and his 18 year-old daughter won’t be leaving the frontline until they defeat IS militants in the area.
Kalhori he left Iran because of his oppostion to the regime in Tehran, and has lived in the Iraqi Kurdistan capital Erbil for more than a decade. By taking up arms, he is showing his love for Kurdistan, he says.
A number of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties have participated with the Peshmerga in fighting IS militants since their attacks on Kurdistan region began last June.
CNN: "On the Road in Iranian Kurdistan"
Hills, hairpins, harmonies: On the road in Iranian Kurdistan
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/travel/iran-kurdistan/
(Pictures in the above link)
Follow us at @CNNTravel on Twitter and Instagram. Like us on Facebook
(CNN)"Yavash, yavash," the small, gray-haired doctor says, leaning across from the passenger seat to put a hand on his friend's shoulder, imploring him to slow down the black Toyota as we approach another hairpin bend in the dusty road.
The driver cheerfully ignores the doctor's pleas and continues to take the corners at a clip, smoking all the while and occasionally breaking into wailed bursts of Kurdish folk song.
We're traveling from Sanandaj, the capital of Iran's Kurdistan province, to Marivan, a small city just a few kilometers from the border with Iraq.
It's the final day of Nowruz, the Iranian new year, and my companions, a doctor called Ghaffar and a taxi driver named Jahan -- both from Sanandaj -- are still on holiday.
In a typical display of Iranian hospitality, they've offered to accompany me on the journey.
To the left of the narrow road is a vertical, sand-colored mountain wall.
To the right, a 50-foot drop and a view across the spectacular Howraman Valley, a sparsely populated and beautiful part of the region.
On the eastern edge of Iran, Kurdistan province makes up part of a broader Kurdish region, which also spans adjacent sections of Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Over the border in Iraq, the territory has been targeted by the Islamic militant group known as ISIS, but Iranian Kurdistan remains unaffected, a peaceful world away from the violence.
It also seems a world away from Iran.
Although we're still within Iran's borders, the Kurdistan region is quite different, and more traditionally Persian compared to the country's heartland.
Colorful dress, religions at odds
Culturally and linguistically, the residents here have more in common with their fellow Kurds across the border than with Iranians from Tehran, Esfahan or Shiraz.
Dress is traditional: men sport baggy shalwar trousers, plain shirts and heavy felt waistcoats, while the women wear colorful dresses and headscarves rather than the black chador or hijab seen throughout much of the rest of Iran.
On the way, we stop in a tiny village called Negel.
The mosque in the village is home to large, handwritten Quran said to be about 1,300 years old.
The mosque's facade carries an inscription naming Abu Bakr the first caliph and, according to Sunni Muslims, the rightful successor of the prophet Mohammed.
Although most Iranians are Shia Muslims, the Kurds are predominantly Sunni and this has often put them at odds with the Iranian government.
A few days earlier, a Kurdish man in Sanandaj had told me that police had forcibly removed a satellite dish from his roof to prevent him receiving Kurdish television channels.
Another had pointed at a photo of a Shia cleric in my guidebook and shaken his head, saying "Not good, not good."
After Negel, the road winds through snow-capped mountains and then drops down into the village of Howraman-at-Takht.
Here the houses are built into the steep hillside, with the roof of one doubling as a porch area for the building behind it. Large blue or green latticed windows face out over the valley. Children chase each other around the streets.
Wandering down the hillside, we stop near a stream to drink tea bought from a small shop.
As in other parts of Iran, people don't sweeten their tea directly, preferring to place a sugar cube between their front teeth and then sucking the tea through the sugar.
The teashop owner asks me where I come from: "Russ-stan, French-stan?" he guesses.
I tell him "England-stan" and he smiles. "Welcome!"
Hairpin bends and dancing
As we drink the tea, an elderly man walks to the edge of the stream, removes his shoes and socks, rolls up his trousers and wades out to a large, flat rock in the stream.
He washes his hands, feet and head and then begins his afternoon prayers, in turn standing, kneeling and then pressing his forehead to the rock.
Once he's finished he carefully negotiates the way back and dries his feet with a cloth.
As we continue the journey, the doctor takes over the driving and progress is slower, but the hairpin bends are no longer quite so terrifying.
We arrive at Marivan in the late afternoon.
A large lake catches the afternoon sun and we stop at a restaurant at its edge.
Some friends of Dr. Ghaffar join us for a meal of barbecued fish, rice and pickled vegetables.
We sit cross-legged on the floor and drink more black tea.
Afterward, music is played and people lock arms and dance in a line, men at one end and women at another, jumping in unison and kicking their feet in time to the music.
One of the women's veils slips back off her hair, but no one pays much attention. The dancing goes on until the sun sets over the lake.
We leave Marivan and head back toward Sanandaj.
The doctor's phone rings and he talks in rapid Farsi before suggesting we stop at a friend's house on the way.
"My friend is very wealthy," he tells me, "and he can trace his family back 1,300 years."
Kurdish pop
We stop on the outskirts of Sanandaj.
The friend's house is certainly that of a rich man; thickset gold picture frames enclose black canvases covered in intricate Persian script, thickly woven carpets are laid out across the floor and a huge flat-screen TV sits in the corner, blaring out Kurdish pop music.
Before stepping further inside, I remind myself that it's not polite to shake hands with women in Iran.
As I'm mentally congratulating myself on my cultural sensitivity, the sister of the owner of the house steps forward, confidently shakes my hand and invites me to sit on the sofa.
Huge bowls of sweets and cashew nuts are laid out.
I sit next to the man's eldest daughter who takes out her iPhone and shows me photos on her Instagram feed.
Most of the images are of Western fashion models. I ask her why and she says: "Model is the best job."
She plans to go to university in Tehran and wants to study German, but her long-term ambition is to leave Iran and she has many questions about life in the West.
It's late and after more dancing -- this time in the marble-floored living room to the music coming from the TV -- it's time to go.
Jahan drives back toward the center of Sanandaj. He sings in Kurdish again, but this time there's a more melancholy tone to the song.
How to get there: British, Canadian and U.S. citizens wishing to travel to Iran must do so as part of an official tour due to restrictions on independent travel.
Most other foreign nationals need to obtain a visa before traveling and the application process can sometimes seem slightly opaque. It's worth checking the most up-to-date visa requirements ahead of traveling as these can change with little notice.
A variety of airlines fly to Iran, with Tehran's Imam Khomeini International Airport the main international hub.
Once in Iran, getting around is made straightforward by the country's comfortable, extensive and relatively cheap bus or train networks, while for longer distances internal flights are an option.
For shorter journeys and day trips, taxis are relatively affordable due to low fuel costs. In Tehran the metro is a good way to dodge the city's heavy traffic.
Adam Chidell is a teacher, writer and photographer, currently based in Bangkok.
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/travel/iran-kurdistan/
(Pictures in the above link)
Follow us at @CNNTravel on Twitter and Instagram. Like us on Facebook
(CNN)"Yavash, yavash," the small, gray-haired doctor says, leaning across from the passenger seat to put a hand on his friend's shoulder, imploring him to slow down the black Toyota as we approach another hairpin bend in the dusty road.
The driver cheerfully ignores the doctor's pleas and continues to take the corners at a clip, smoking all the while and occasionally breaking into wailed bursts of Kurdish folk song.
We're traveling from Sanandaj, the capital of Iran's Kurdistan province, to Marivan, a small city just a few kilometers from the border with Iraq.
It's the final day of Nowruz, the Iranian new year, and my companions, a doctor called Ghaffar and a taxi driver named Jahan -- both from Sanandaj -- are still on holiday.
In a typical display of Iranian hospitality, they've offered to accompany me on the journey.
To the left of the narrow road is a vertical, sand-colored mountain wall.
To the right, a 50-foot drop and a view across the spectacular Howraman Valley, a sparsely populated and beautiful part of the region.
On the eastern edge of Iran, Kurdistan province makes up part of a broader Kurdish region, which also spans adjacent sections of Iraq, Syria and Turkey.
Over the border in Iraq, the territory has been targeted by the Islamic militant group known as ISIS, but Iranian Kurdistan remains unaffected, a peaceful world away from the violence.
It also seems a world away from Iran.
Although we're still within Iran's borders, the Kurdistan region is quite different, and more traditionally Persian compared to the country's heartland.
Colorful dress, religions at odds
Culturally and linguistically, the residents here have more in common with their fellow Kurds across the border than with Iranians from Tehran, Esfahan or Shiraz.
Dress is traditional: men sport baggy shalwar trousers, plain shirts and heavy felt waistcoats, while the women wear colorful dresses and headscarves rather than the black chador or hijab seen throughout much of the rest of Iran.
On the way, we stop in a tiny village called Negel.
The mosque in the village is home to large, handwritten Quran said to be about 1,300 years old.
The mosque's facade carries an inscription naming Abu Bakr the first caliph and, according to Sunni Muslims, the rightful successor of the prophet Mohammed.
Although most Iranians are Shia Muslims, the Kurds are predominantly Sunni and this has often put them at odds with the Iranian government.
A few days earlier, a Kurdish man in Sanandaj had told me that police had forcibly removed a satellite dish from his roof to prevent him receiving Kurdish television channels.
Another had pointed at a photo of a Shia cleric in my guidebook and shaken his head, saying "Not good, not good."
After Negel, the road winds through snow-capped mountains and then drops down into the village of Howraman-at-Takht.
Here the houses are built into the steep hillside, with the roof of one doubling as a porch area for the building behind it. Large blue or green latticed windows face out over the valley. Children chase each other around the streets.
Wandering down the hillside, we stop near a stream to drink tea bought from a small shop.
As in other parts of Iran, people don't sweeten their tea directly, preferring to place a sugar cube between their front teeth and then sucking the tea through the sugar.
The teashop owner asks me where I come from: "Russ-stan, French-stan?" he guesses.
I tell him "England-stan" and he smiles. "Welcome!"
Hairpin bends and dancing
As we drink the tea, an elderly man walks to the edge of the stream, removes his shoes and socks, rolls up his trousers and wades out to a large, flat rock in the stream.
He washes his hands, feet and head and then begins his afternoon prayers, in turn standing, kneeling and then pressing his forehead to the rock.
Once he's finished he carefully negotiates the way back and dries his feet with a cloth.
As we continue the journey, the doctor takes over the driving and progress is slower, but the hairpin bends are no longer quite so terrifying.
We arrive at Marivan in the late afternoon.
A large lake catches the afternoon sun and we stop at a restaurant at its edge.
Some friends of Dr. Ghaffar join us for a meal of barbecued fish, rice and pickled vegetables.
We sit cross-legged on the floor and drink more black tea.
Afterward, music is played and people lock arms and dance in a line, men at one end and women at another, jumping in unison and kicking their feet in time to the music.
One of the women's veils slips back off her hair, but no one pays much attention. The dancing goes on until the sun sets over the lake.
We leave Marivan and head back toward Sanandaj.
The doctor's phone rings and he talks in rapid Farsi before suggesting we stop at a friend's house on the way.
"My friend is very wealthy," he tells me, "and he can trace his family back 1,300 years."
Kurdish pop
We stop on the outskirts of Sanandaj.
The friend's house is certainly that of a rich man; thickset gold picture frames enclose black canvases covered in intricate Persian script, thickly woven carpets are laid out across the floor and a huge flat-screen TV sits in the corner, blaring out Kurdish pop music.
Before stepping further inside, I remind myself that it's not polite to shake hands with women in Iran.
As I'm mentally congratulating myself on my cultural sensitivity, the sister of the owner of the house steps forward, confidently shakes my hand and invites me to sit on the sofa.
Huge bowls of sweets and cashew nuts are laid out.
I sit next to the man's eldest daughter who takes out her iPhone and shows me photos on her Instagram feed.
Most of the images are of Western fashion models. I ask her why and she says: "Model is the best job."
She plans to go to university in Tehran and wants to study German, but her long-term ambition is to leave Iran and she has many questions about life in the West.
It's late and after more dancing -- this time in the marble-floored living room to the music coming from the TV -- it's time to go.
Jahan drives back toward the center of Sanandaj. He sings in Kurdish again, but this time there's a more melancholy tone to the song.
How to get there: British, Canadian and U.S. citizens wishing to travel to Iran must do so as part of an official tour due to restrictions on independent travel.
Most other foreign nationals need to obtain a visa before traveling and the application process can sometimes seem slightly opaque. It's worth checking the most up-to-date visa requirements ahead of traveling as these can change with little notice.
A variety of airlines fly to Iran, with Tehran's Imam Khomeini International Airport the main international hub.
Once in Iran, getting around is made straightforward by the country's comfortable, extensive and relatively cheap bus or train networks, while for longer distances internal flights are an option.
For shorter journeys and day trips, taxis are relatively affordable due to low fuel costs. In Tehran the metro is a good way to dodge the city's heavy traffic.
Adam Chidell is a teacher, writer and photographer, currently based in Bangkok.
East Kurdistan News- January 28th
Iranian Kurdistan News in brief – January 28, 2015
Ekurd
Posted on January 28, 2015 by Editorial Staff in Iranian Kurdistan News in brief
Kurdish politicla prisoner Fakhredin Faraji Transferred to a Hospital in Birjand
Fakhredin Faraji, a Kurdish political prisoner of Tabas prison was transferred to medical center outside the prison. According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), on Monday 26th January, Fakhredin Faraji, political prisoners of Tabas prison, was transferred to a hospital in the city of Birjand. This political prisoner who suffers from lumbar disc and consequently from severe back pain will have an operation in that hospital. It is to say, Fakhredin Faraji has been transferred to Tabas prison since 4 years ago and now is held with another political prisoner named Mohammad Amin Abdullahi at this prison. Fakhredin Faraji who was arrested along with three others on 6th June 2011 near Shovisheh, a village of Sine (Sanandaj) in Iranian Kurdistan, by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and on 25th August 2012 and was sentenced to endure thirty years imprisonment and exile to Tabas by the branch 1 of Revolutionary Court in Sanandaj on charges of acting against national security and membership in Komaleh party. hra-news.org| Ekurd.net
PJAK: Political/military operations of Iran is to militarize Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat)
“Mass arrests, raids artillery of Iran, political operations and military presence in Kurdistan is the meaning of militarizing the Kurdish region,” said the Council of Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) in a statement. The statement of PJAK is as follows: “After growth of quality of knowledge of the peoples of the Middle East and increase its presence in the political arena, social and cultural rights, the government used both global as well as regional powers to try to lower the higher frequency and intensity, positive and compressing it. Iran as a country participating in the current issues of regional and global impact on the entire plane surfaces have taken their domestic and foreign mutual policy; and the other side is its participation in world affairs, they require their rights, as well as with a combination of policies of classic and modern colonial policy in domestic politics, attempts to violate the equal rights of Iranian nationalities. With the balance of Iran’s demand for world power, we witnessed the growth policy of occupation and imperialists of this government to the Iranian nationalities in the political geography of the country. The PJAK, or the (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane) (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), is a militant Kurdish nationalist group based on the border areas between Iraq’s Kurdistan region and Iran’s Kurdish region. Since 2004 the PJAK took up arms took up arms to establish a semi-autonomous Kurdish regional entities or Kurdish federal states in Iran, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. The PJAK has about 3,000 armed militiamen, half the members of PJAK are women…diclehaber.com | Ekurd.net
Kurdish Sunni Imam severely beaten in Iranian Kurdistan
Bokan: A Kurdish Imam from Iran’s Kurdish minority was left unconscious in a field in Iranian Kurdistan (West Azerbaijan province) after being interrogated and savagely beaten by plain-clothed officers on Monday 19 January 2015. According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Ali Hosseinzadeh, the Imam of the Khankandi village mosque in the city of Miandoab, was pursued by plain-clothed armed officers near the village of Dash Band on the Bokan-Miandoab road on Monday evening. He was chased by the armed officers, who were travelling in two cars with personalized number plates, until he was detained near the village of Anbar in the Akhtachi-ye Sharqi Rural District. He was immediately blindfolded, and officers began to interrogate him in the open field. After refusing to answer their questions or participate in the field interrogation, the officers began to attack him. The officers punched and beat him severely, and suffocated him by pushing his head into the mud, before they abandoned his lifeless body. Out of the five attackers, four had been Persian speakers, indicating that they were not local to the area. Only one of the officers had spoken in Kurdish…hra-news.org| Ekurd.net
Ekurd
Posted on January 28, 2015 by Editorial Staff in Iranian Kurdistan News in brief
Kurdish politicla prisoner Fakhredin Faraji Transferred to a Hospital in Birjand
Fakhredin Faraji, a Kurdish political prisoner of Tabas prison was transferred to medical center outside the prison. According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), on Monday 26th January, Fakhredin Faraji, political prisoners of Tabas prison, was transferred to a hospital in the city of Birjand. This political prisoner who suffers from lumbar disc and consequently from severe back pain will have an operation in that hospital. It is to say, Fakhredin Faraji has been transferred to Tabas prison since 4 years ago and now is held with another political prisoner named Mohammad Amin Abdullahi at this prison. Fakhredin Faraji who was arrested along with three others on 6th June 2011 near Shovisheh, a village of Sine (Sanandaj) in Iranian Kurdistan, by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and on 25th August 2012 and was sentenced to endure thirty years imprisonment and exile to Tabas by the branch 1 of Revolutionary Court in Sanandaj on charges of acting against national security and membership in Komaleh party. hra-news.org| Ekurd.net
PJAK: Political/military operations of Iran is to militarize Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat)
“Mass arrests, raids artillery of Iran, political operations and military presence in Kurdistan is the meaning of militarizing the Kurdish region,” said the Council of Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) in a statement. The statement of PJAK is as follows: “After growth of quality of knowledge of the peoples of the Middle East and increase its presence in the political arena, social and cultural rights, the government used both global as well as regional powers to try to lower the higher frequency and intensity, positive and compressing it. Iran as a country participating in the current issues of regional and global impact on the entire plane surfaces have taken their domestic and foreign mutual policy; and the other side is its participation in world affairs, they require their rights, as well as with a combination of policies of classic and modern colonial policy in domestic politics, attempts to violate the equal rights of Iranian nationalities. With the balance of Iran’s demand for world power, we witnessed the growth policy of occupation and imperialists of this government to the Iranian nationalities in the political geography of the country. The PJAK, or the (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistane) (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), is a militant Kurdish nationalist group based on the border areas between Iraq’s Kurdistan region and Iran’s Kurdish region. Since 2004 the PJAK took up arms took up arms to establish a semi-autonomous Kurdish regional entities or Kurdish federal states in Iran, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. The PJAK has about 3,000 armed militiamen, half the members of PJAK are women…diclehaber.com | Ekurd.net
Kurdish Sunni Imam severely beaten in Iranian Kurdistan
Bokan: A Kurdish Imam from Iran’s Kurdish minority was left unconscious in a field in Iranian Kurdistan (West Azerbaijan province) after being interrogated and savagely beaten by plain-clothed officers on Monday 19 January 2015. According to the report of Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA), Ali Hosseinzadeh, the Imam of the Khankandi village mosque in the city of Miandoab, was pursued by plain-clothed armed officers near the village of Dash Band on the Bokan-Miandoab road on Monday evening. He was chased by the armed officers, who were travelling in two cars with personalized number plates, until he was detained near the village of Anbar in the Akhtachi-ye Sharqi Rural District. He was immediately blindfolded, and officers began to interrogate him in the open field. After refusing to answer their questions or participate in the field interrogation, the officers began to attack him. The officers punched and beat him severely, and suffocated him by pushing his head into the mud, before they abandoned his lifeless body. Out of the five attackers, four had been Persian speakers, indicating that they were not local to the area. Only one of the officers had spoken in Kurdish…hra-news.org| Ekurd.net
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